Misinterpreting Others and the Fragility of Social Learning by Frick, Mira et al.
MISINTERPRETING OTHERS AND THE FRAGILITY OF SOCIAL LEARNING 
By 
Mira Frick, Ryota Iijima, and Yuhta Ishii 
January 2019 
Revised March 2020 
COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 2160R 
COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS 
YALE UNIVERSITY 
Box 208281 
New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8281 
http://cowles.yale.edu/ 
Misinterpreting Others and the Fragility of Social Learning∗
Mira Frick Ryota Iijima Yuhta Ishii
Abstract
We exhibit a natural environment, social learning among heterogeneous agents, where even
slight misperceptions can have a large negative impact on long-run learning outcomes. We
consider a population of agents who obtain information about the state of the world both from
initial private signals and by observing a random sample of other agents’ actions over time, where
agents’ actions depend not only on their beliefs about the state but also on their idiosyncratic
types (e.g., tastes or risk attitudes). When agents are correct about the type distribution in
the population, they learn the true state in the long run. By contrast, we show, first, that even
arbitrarily small amounts of misperception about the type distribution can generate extreme
breakdowns of information aggregation, where in the long run all agents incorrectly assign prob-
ability 1 to some fixed state of the world, regardless of the true underlying state. Second, any
misperception of the type distribution leads long-run beliefs and behavior to vary only coarsely
with the state, and we provide systematic predictions for how the nature of misperception
shapes these coarse long-run outcomes. Third, we show that how fragile information aggrega-
tion is against misperception depends on the richness of agents’ payoff-relevant uncertainty; a
design implication is that information aggregation can be improved by simplifying agents’ learn-
ing environment. The key feature behind our findings is that agents’ belief-updating becomes
“decoupled” from the true state over time. We point to other environments where this feature
is present and leads to similar fragility results.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Overview
In many economic and social settings, individuals hold limited private information about a payoff-
relevant state of the world and rely on observing the behavior of others as a vital source of additional
information. Typically, however, others’ behavior reflects not only their own information about
the state of the world, but is also influenced by their idiosyncratic characteristics. For example,
in assessing the quality of a new product or a political candidate, people may draw inferences
from the purchasing decisions or stated opinions of others, but these depend at least in part on
others’ consumption tastes or political preferences. Likewise, in many decentralized markets (such
as over-the-counter markets or privately held auctions), agents learn about market fundamentals by
observing other participants’ trading behavior, yet the latter may also be driven by idiosyncratic
features such as risk attitudes, private values or liquidity constraints.
A classic question concerns the possibility of information aggregation in such settings, that is,
under what conditions individuals are able to learn the true state of the world in the long run. A
large literature has studied this question under the modeling assumption that individuals possess a
correct understanding of their environment, in particular of the distribution of relevant population
characteristics.1 This conflicts with growing empirical evidence that people are prone to systematic
misperceptions about such distributions; from under- or overestimating the heterogeneity of socio-
political attitudes, consumption tastes or wealth levels in their societies to misjudging the share
of “fake” product recommenders or political supporters on review platforms and social networking
sites.2 Such evidence has motivated a burgeoning theoretical literature to incorporate various forms
of misspecification into models of social learning (see Section 1.2). At the same time, a widely held
view of models is summarized by George Box’s saying that “all models are wrong,” but “cunningly
chosen parsimonious models often do provide remarkably useful approximations” (Box, 1979). This
raises the question how severe agents’ misperceptions must be to motivate departing from the
standard model: Does the correctly specified model perhaps offer a good enough approximation as
long as the amount of misperception is sufficiently small?
The first main result in this paper suggests a negative answer to the latter question. We consider
a population of agents who obtain information about the state of the world both from initial private
signals and by observing a random sample of other agents’ actions over time, where agents’ actions
depend not only on their beliefs about the state but also on their idiosyncratic types. When agents
are correct about the type distribution in the population, they learn the true state in the long
run. By contrast, we show that even arbitrarily small amounts of misperception about the type
distribution can generate extreme breakdowns of information aggregation, where in the long run
all agents incorrectly assign probability 1 to some fixed state of the world, regardless of the true
underlying state.
1For surveys, see Vives (2010); Chamley (2004).
2See Section 2.4 for references.
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This stark discontinuous departure motivates analyzing information aggregation under mis-
perception in its own right, without extrapolating from the predictions of the correctly specified
benchmark. Our second main result shows that any misperception about the type distribution gives
rise to a specific failure of information aggregation where agents’ long-run beliefs and behavior vary
only coarsely with the state. Moreover, we provide systematic predictions for how the nature of
misperception shapes these coarse long-run outcomes. Finally, our third main result shows that
how fragile information aggregation is against misperception depends on the richness of agents’
payoff-relevant uncertainty. A design implication is that information aggregation can be improved
through interventions aimed at simplifying the agents’ learning environment. As we discuss, the key
feature behind our findings is that agents’ belief-updating becomes “decoupled” from the true state
over time, and we point to other learning environments where this feature is present and likewise
leads to fragility against even arbitrarily small amounts of misperception.
In our model, a large population of agents choose actions in each period t ∈ {1, 2, . . .} to
maximize their expected utility given their time t information about a fixed but unknown state of
the world ω ∈ Ω = [ω, ω]. Each agent’s utility to a given action depends not only on the state
ω, but also on his idiosyncratic type θ, where types in the population are distributed according to
some cumulative distribution function (cdf) F . Each agent i’s time t information about ω consists
of two sources: First, in period 0, i observes a private signal about ω; second, in each period up to
time t, i randomly meets some other agent j and observes j’s action in that period.
Our focus is on the case where agents are misspecified about the type distribution, in the sense
that they misperceive the true cdf F to be some other cdf F̂ . Here agents’ amount of misperception
can be quantified by standard notions of distance between cdfs F̂ and F .3 To isolate the effect of
such misperception, we impose appropriate assumptions on signals and payoffs that ensure that if
agents are correct about F , then information aggregation is successful (Lemma 1); intuitively, by
observing a sufficiently large sample of others’ actions, agents are able to back out the true state in
the long run if they interpret observed actions correctly.4
By contrast, when agents misperceive the type distribution, this entails the possibility of mis-
interpreting other agents, in the sense of drawing incorrect inferences about the state from their
actions. Nevertheless, one might expect that as long as the amount of misperception is small, this
effect should likewise be small, and information aggregation should be approximately successful.
Indeed, a natural analogy is with a single agent who receives repeated exogenous signals about
the state of the world, but misperceives the mapping from states to signals. In this case, a classic
result due to Berk (1966) implies that the agent’s long-run belief is approximately correct when the
3We use the total variation distance, but our results go through under other standard norms.
4Our correctly specified benchmark is a close variant of Duffie and Manso’s (2007) random matching model of
social learning, where information aggregation is likewise successful, as is also the case for sequential social learning
models with either rich type heterogeneity, unbounded private signals, or rich actions (e.g., Goeree, Palfrey, and
Rogers, 2006; Smith and Sørensen, 2000; Lee, 1993). As we discuss in Section 4.1, information aggregation can fail
in other important correctly specified settings, notably due to herding or informational cascades (e.g., Bikhchandani,
Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992; Banerjee, 1992), but the failures of information aggregation we obtain under even
vanishingly small amounts of misperception are more extreme and cannot arise in any correctly specified model.
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amount of his misperception is small (Proposition 0).
Theorem 1 offers a sharp contrast to this single-agent benchmark. In our social learning setting,
even vanishingly small amounts of misperception can lead to extreme breakdowns of information
aggregation, where long-run beliefs are state-independent point masses: For any state ω̂, there exists
a perception F̂ that is arbitrarily close to the true cdf F , but under which in all states ω, all agents’
long-run beliefs incorrectly assign probability 1 to ω̂.
The logic behind Theorem 1 can be illustrated heuristically as follows. Suppose agents’ beliefs
converge to a point mass on some state ω̂. Then our payoff assumptions imply that behavior con-
verges to a threshold strategy, where the types taking action 0 are precisely those below some cutoff
θ∗(ω̂) that is monotonic in ω̂. Thus, if agents’ perceived type distribution is F̂ , they expect fraction
F̂ (θ∗(ω̂)) of long-run action observations to be 0. However, the actual fraction is F (θ∗(ω̂)), as the
true cdf is F . Except for boundary cases, we note that there cannot be any discrepancy between
expected and actual action observations, i.e., it must be that F̂ (θ∗(ω̂)) = F (θ∗(ω̂)); intuitively,
otherwise long-run beliefs could not concentrate on ω̂, because agents could find some other state
ω̂′ 6= ω̂ that better explains their observations. The key feature of the equality F̂ (θ∗(ω̂)) = F (θ∗(ω̂))
governing potential long-run beliefs is that it is decoupled from the true state, in the sense that it
does not depend on the realized ω. As a result, even for perceptions F̂ that are arbitrarily close
to F , this equality can admit a unique solution ω̂, and in this case a point mass on ω̂ is the only
possible long-run belief, regardless of the true state ω. This heuristic explanation side-steps the
question of whether agents’ beliefs converge, which is not obvious, since under misperception beliefs
do not follow a martingale. Section 4.2 illustrates the argument for convergence, which is based on
approximating our original model by a simple “limit model.”
The decoupling mechanism highlighted above arises because agents’ belief-updating places less
and less weight over time on own initial private signals and increasingly more weight on others’
behavior, but the latter depends on the true state only indirectly through others’ beliefs. As we
discuss in Section 4.3, this distinguishes our setting from the aforementioned single-agent passive
learning benchmark, as well as recent models of misspecified single-agent active learning, such as
Heidhues, Koszegi, and Strack (2018). In those models, the agent’s belief-updating does not become
decoupled from the true state, because it is based on informative signals that depend directly on ω
even asymptotically; as a result, long-run beliefs are approximately correct under small amounts of
misperception. At the same time, Section 7 points to several other natural environments, including
single-agent learning under a particular identification failure and other social learning settings,
where belief-updating also becomes decoupled, giving rise to similar fragility results as Theorem 1.
While Theorem 1 highlights that vanishingly small amounts of misperception can generate stark
discontinuous departures from the correctly specified benchmark, not every misperception F̂ nec-
essarily gives rise to breakdowns of information aggregation that are as extreme as in Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 therefore investigates information aggregation under arbitrary well-behaved true and
perceived type distributions F and F̂ . Based on the decoupling mechanism highlighted above, we
show that information aggregation continues to fail, but in general long-run beliefs need not be fully
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state-independent and instead display the following weaker form of “coarseness:” F and F̂ generate
a partition of the state space Ω = [ω, ω] into finitely many intervals, and within each such interval,
agents’ long-run beliefs incorrectly assign probability 1 to the same fixed state. As a result, long-run
behavior also varies only coarsely with the true state, remaining constant within each interval of
the partition and changing discretely from one interval to the next. As we discuss, this prediction
is broadly in line with the fact that behavior in many economic settings is not finely attuned to
economic fundamentals, suggesting a possible new channel for this phenomenon. Theorem 2 also
provides a starting point to analyze how long-run beliefs vary across different forms of mispercep-
tion. As an illustration, Section 4.4 shows that when F and F̂ are ranked according to first-order
stochastic dominance (e.g., when agents under-/overestimate the share of “fake” recommenders)
long-run beliefs exhibit drastic overoptimism/-pessimism; by contrast, underestimating population
heterogeneity leads to conservative long-run beliefs.
Finally, Theorem 3 highlights a key determinant of the fragility of information aggregation, by
showing that information aggregation is more sensitive to misperception the richer the state space.
Suppose we approximate our continuous state space Ω = [ω, ω] by an increasingly fine sequence Ωn
of finite state spaces. Then for each n, there is some threshold εn such that information aggregation
is successful whenever the amount of misperception is below this threshold. However, as the size of
the state space grows, εn shrinks to 0, so that information aggregation is more and more sensitive to
misperception, and in the limit, arbitrarily small amounts of misperception can give rise to extreme
breakdowns of information aggregation analogous to Theorem 1. Many settings of economic interest
naturally feature rich state spaces, from safety levels of new products to market fundamentals under
decentralized trade. From a design perspective, Theorem 3 implies that information aggregation in
such settings can be improved by simplifying the agents’ learning environment: For instance, in the
context of news releases by a central bank or consumer protection agency, Example 3 highlights a
new trade-off between providing more information for agents to aggregate and rendering information
aggregation more sensitive to misperception, and we argue that this may call for releasing only
“vague” information.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 establishes two prelimi-
nary benchmarks: Successful information aggregation under the correctly specified model and the
robustness of single-agent passive learning to small amounts of missperception. Sections 4 and 5
present our main results, Theorems 1–3. Section 6 discusses more general forms of misperception,
in particular the interaction between misspecified and correctly specified agents. Finally, Section 7
concludes by pointing to other natural learning environments where similar fragility results apply.
1.2 Related Literature
Our paper contributes to the burgeoning literature on Bayesian learning with misspecified models,
which has been studied in a variety of contexts spanning single-agent passive and active learning
(e.g., Nyarko, 1991; Rabin, 2002; Rabin and Vayanos, 2010; Ortoleva and Snowberg, 2015; Fuden-
berg, Romanyuk, and Strack, 2017; Heidhues, Koszegi, and Strack, 2018, 2019; He, 2018) and social
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learning (e.g., Eyster and Rabin, 2010; Guarino and Jehiel, 2013; Bohren, 2016; Gagnon-Bartsch,
2017; Dasaratha and He, 2017; Bohren and Hauser, 2019; Bohren, Imas, and Rosenberg, 2018).5
Our main contribution is to point to a natural setting, social learning with misperceptions of oth-
ers’ characteristics, where even vanishingly small amounts of misspecification can lead to stark
breakdowns of learning and to highlight a decoupling mechanism that drives this fragility result.6
Among single-agent learning models, the most closely related paper is Heidhues, Koszegi, and
Strack (2018), who study active learning by an agent who is overconfident in his ability. They
emphasize that the fact that the agent’s information depends on his actions (and hence his beliefs)
can amplify the effect of misperception over time, a force that is present in our setting as well.
However, as we discuss in Section 4.3, their setting differs from ours in that learning does not
become decoupled from the true state and, as a result, the agent’s long-run belief is approximately
correct when his amount of misperception is small.
In the context of social learning, several of the aforementioned papers incorporate various spe-
cific forms of misspecification into sequential social learning models and show that long-run beliefs
grow confident in incorrect states. However, in contrast with our fragility result, they rely on strong
forms of misspecification, and in a general framework that nests several of these misspecifications,
Bohren and Hauser (2019) show that information aggregation is robust to small amounts of mis-
specification.7 As we discuss in Section 7.3, this distinction stems from an assumption in these
models that rules out decoupled learning; absent this assumption, we show that sequential social
learning can likewise be fragile, although the exact fragility mechanism and results differ from our
random matching setting.
Esponda and Pouzo (2016) introduce Berk-Nash equilibrium to capture long-run beliefs under
repetition of a game with (a single or multiple) misspecified players.8 Due to its nonstationarity,
our setting does not strictly fit into their framework, but we show that, just as under Berk-Nash,
agents’ long-run beliefs are based on minimization of KL-divergence. Indeed, except for boundary
cases, long-run beliefs achieve zero KL-divergence between perceived and actual behavior.
Acemoglu, Chernozhukov, and Yildiz (2016) consider agents who observe exogenous public sig-
nals and hold non-common full support priors about the signal technology. In contrast with our
focus on learning about the state, they focus on higher-order belief disagreement and show that
even a small amount of uncertainty can lead to substantial long-run disagreement, due to a non-
identification problem in disentangling states and signal technologies. As agents in their model are
5See Glaeser and Sunstein (2009); Levy and Razin (2015) for static models of information aggregation with
misspecified agents. Specific forms of misspecification have also been incorporated into macroeconomic models; for a
survey, see Evans and Honkapohja (2012). Hassan and Mertens (2017) consider a general equilibrium model in which
agents misperceive signals about economic fundamentals. In their setting, small amounts of misperception have a
continuous effect on equilibrium, but they emphasize that the slope of this effect can be arbitrarily large.
6We note that our fragility results are driven purely by misinferences from others’ actions, rather than by payoff
externalities. The latter channel drives Madarász and Prat’s (2017) finding that screening problems can be highly
sensitive to misspecification by the principal about agents’ preferences.
7In Gagnon-Bartsch (2017), beliefs can fail to converge under an arbitrarily small amount of misperception, but
agents’ long-run average beliefs depend continuously on their misperceptions.
8Related approaches include Esponda (2008), Spiegler (2016), and Jehiel (2018). Esponda and Pouzo (2019)
formalize Berk-Nash equilibrium for single-agent learning in a Markovian environment.
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correctly specified (i.e., their beliefs contain the truth in their support), it is not possible to generate
long-run phenomena such as state-independent point-mass beliefs.
A sizeable literature considers models of non-Bayesian social learning where agents update be-
liefs by employing various exogenous heuristics (e.g., Ellison and Fudenberg, 1993, 1995; DeMarzo,
Vayanos, and Zwiebel, 2003; Golub and Jackson, 2010, 2012). Information aggregation can fail in
such settings as well. For example, Mueller-Frank (2018) considers DeGroot-style learning on a
network, where an agent can manipulate his updating rule, and shows that small amounts of ma-
nipulation can have a significant and arbitrary impact on other agents’ long-run beliefs. Given our
goal of understanding the robustness of the canonical model of rational social learning, we maintain
the classical assumption that agents are Bayesian. This also allows us to explicitly model agents’




There is a continuum of agents with mass normalized to 1. Each agent is endowed with a fixed
(preference) type θ ∈ R. Each agent’s type is his private information. Types in the population are
distributed according to a cdf F that admits a positive density over R. Let F denote the space of
such cdfs.
At the beginning of period 0, a state of the world ω is drawn once and for all from a cdf Ψ that
admits a positive and continuous density over a bounded interval Ω := [ω, ω] ⊆ R. Agents do not
observe the realization of ω. At the beginning of each period t = 1, 2, . . ., each agent i chooses an
action ait ∈ {0, 1} to myopically maximize his expected utility given his period t information about
ω.9 We assume binary actions for simplicity, but as we discuss in Supplementary Appendix E.3,
analogous insights obtain under continuous actions.
We specify information in the next subsection. Each agent’s utility u(a, θ, ω) depends on his
action, his type, and the state of the world. We assume the utility difference u(1, θ, ω)− u(0, θ, ω)
between actions 1 and 0 to be strictly increasing and continuously differentiable in both θ and ω,
and denote this difference by u(θ, ω). Moreover, limθ→∞ u(θ, ω) > 0 and limθ→−∞ u(θ, ω) < 0; that
is, for high (respectively, low) enough types it is always optimal to choose action 1 (respectively,
action 0).10 For each ω, let θ∗(ω) denote the threshold type that is indifferent between both actions
in state ω; θ∗(ω) is uniquely defined by u(θ∗(ω), ω) = 0 and is strictly decreasing in ω.
9Myopia is without loss in this setting as players’ actions do not affect their information.
10Such dominant types play the following technical role. They ensure (i) that information aggregation is successful
in the correctly specified model (Lemma 1) and (ii) that both actions are observed with positive probability in each
period; (ii) avoids the problem of belief-updating after zero probability events, as regardless of their perceptions
F̂ ∈ F , agents never encounter observations they considered impossible. In the context of word-of-mouth learning
about the quality of a new product, Example 1 interprets such types as “fake” recommenders.
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2.2 Information
At the end of period 0, each agent i observes a private signal si ∈ R about the state of the world.
Conditional on any realized state ω, private signals are drawn i.i.d. across agents from cdf Φ(·|ω)
with positive density φ(·|ω) over R.11 Private signal distributions satisfy the monotone likelihood
ratio property; that is, for each ω > ω′, φ(s|ω)φ(s|ω′) is strictly increasing in s, so that higher signal
realizations are more indicative of higher states.
At the end of each period t = 1, 2, . . ., each agent i randomly meets another agent j and observes
j’s period t action ajt.12 We assume independent random matching, in the sense that j’s type θj is
drawn from the type distribution F in the population, independent of i’s own type θi; Section 7.1
briefly discusses incorporating non-independent assortative random matching.
Thus, at the beginning of each period t = 1, 2, . . ., each agent’s information about the state
consists of two sources: His private signal in period 0; and, if t ≥ 2, a random sample of other
agents’ actions in periods 1, . . . , t − 1. Note that agents do not observe and draw inferences from
their utilities; two natural interpretations of this include settings where payoffs are realized only in
the long run or where successive generations of agents take one-shot actions (see Section 2.4).
2.3 Perceptions and Inferences
In drawing inferences from other agents’ actions, we allow for the possibility that agents are misspec-
ified about the type distribution F in the population. Specifically, throughout most of the analysis,
we assume that there is some cdf F̂ ∈ F such that all agents believe the true type distribution to
be F̂ and believe that F̂ is common certainty. We refer to F̂ as agents’ perceived type distribution
(perception for short) and focus on the case of misperception, where F̂ 6= F . This parsimonious
departure from the correctly specified model, where F̂ = F , is enough to convey our main insights,
but Section 6 discusses more general misperceptions.
The key implication of misperception is the possibility that agents may draw incorrect infer-
ences about the state from their observations of other agents’ actions. We will be particularly
interested in the case when the amount of misperception is small. To formalize this, we mea-
sure the amount of misperception by the total variation distance between F̂ and F ; that is,
‖F̂ − F‖ := supB∈B |
´
1B(θ) dF̂ (θ) −
´
1B(θ) dF (θ)|, where B denotes the Borel σ-algebra on R.
Our results go through under other standard norms (see footnote 22).
Aside from their potential misperception of the type distribution, agents’ inferences are standard.
In particular, the true distributions of states, Ψ, and of private signals, Φ(·|ω), are common certainty
among agents (Section 4.3 briefly discusses incorporating misperceptions about these distributions).
Moreover, given perception F̂ , agents draw inferences from information in each period by Bayesian
11We assume full-support signal distributions for notational simplicity. Our results remain valid as long as all
densities φ(·|ω) admit the same support S ⊆ R.
12We follow convention in assuming a law of large numbers over a continuum of i.i.d. random variables (i.e., agents’
observations of signals and of other agents’ actions in a given period). Thus, in aggregate, a deterministic fraction of
















with type θj ∼ F ,
observe aj1




with type θj ∼ F ,
observe ajt
· · ·
Figure 1: Timeline. At the end of each period, each agent i Bayesian-updates his belief belief about the state given
the perception that the type distribution is F̂ .
updating; more precisely, agents’ actions and beliefs in each period follow the perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of our environment.13 Figure 1 summarizes the timeline of the model.
In any state ω and at the beginning of each period t ≥ 1, let µωt ∈ ∆(∆(Ω)) denote the population
distribution over agents’ posterior beliefs about the state.14 To study information aggregation, we
consider the distribution of long-run beliefs; that is, the limit µω∞ := limt→∞ µωt with respect to the
topology of weak convergence. Whenever µω∞ exists and assigns probability 1 to a Dirac measure
δω′ on some state ω′, we say that in state ω almost all agents’ beliefs converge to a point mass on
ω′; if ω′ = ω, then information aggregation in state ω is successful.
2.4 Examples
The above framework captures numerous economic and social situations:
(i) Learning from others’ behavior. In assessing the long-term health effects ω of potentially risky
behaviors (e.g., recreational drug use) or new products (e.g., GMO foods), individuals may possess
only a “fuzzy” understanding s ∼ Φ(·|ω) of existing research on the subject and obtain additional
information by observing other agents’ day-to-day behavior and consumption choices at.
(ii) Word-of-mouth communication. Based on a political candidate’s campaign announcement
speech or a promotional trailer for an upcoming movie or music album, people may form their own
opinions about the expected quality of the candidate or product, but update these opinions after
hearing others’ assessments.
(iii) Decentralized markets. Duffie and Manso (2007) propose a related framework (without type
heterogeneity and misperceptions thereof) to capture decentralized markets (e.g., the markets for
real estate or over-the-counter securities), where agents who are uncertain about market funda-
mentals may randomly encounter other participants (e.g., at privately held auctions) and gather
additional information by observing their trading behavior (e.g., their bids).
In each of the above settings, other agents’ behavior is influenced not only by their own infor-
mation, but also by their heterogeneous characteristics θ (e.g., consumption tastes, socio-political
preferences, risk attitudes, liquidity constraints). Moreover, as highlighted in the introduction, a
13Given common certainty that the type distribution is F̂ , equilibrium beliefs about ω are uniquely determined at
each history and actions are uniquely determined except for a measure zero set of agents who are indifferent.
14Given a topological space X, we let ∆(X) denote the set of Borel measures over X. For X = ∆(Ω), we endow
X with the topology of weak convergence.
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growing empirical literature suggests that agents are prone to systematically misperceive the distri-
butions of these characteristics, from under- or overestimating the heterogeneity of socio-political
attitudes, consumption tastes or wealth levels in their societies to misjudging the share of “fake”
product recommenders or political supporters on review platforms and social networking sites.15
Finally, we note that an implicit assumption in the previous examples is that agents take actions
repeatedly, but do not observe their payoffs to these actions, as is assumed in a number of social
learning models.16 This fits many settings where states affect payoffs only in the long run, e.g.,
long-term health effects in (i), the quality of a political candidate once in office in (ii), or an asset
conditioned on a distant future event in (iii). Similar to the literature on sequential social learning,
our model also fits settings where successive generations of agents take one-shot actions whose
payoffs they observe privately, and subsequent generations observe a random sample of previous
agents’ actions.
3 Preliminary Benchmarks
Before turning to analyze information aggregation under misperception about the type distribution
in Section 4, this section presents two preliminary benchmarks that will serve as a helpful contrast
to our main results. In Section 3.1, we show that when agents’ perception of the type distribution is
correct, information aggregation is successful in all states. In Section 3.2, we consider a single agent
who observes an exogenous sequence of random actions and misperceives the distribution of actions
in each state. We show that in this case, the agent’s long-run beliefs are approximately correct as
long as the amount of misperception is sufficiently small.
3.1 Information Aggregation under Correct Perceptions
We first show that when agents correctly perceive the type distribution F , they learn the true state
in the long run. We will invoke this result in analyzing the case with misperception in Section 4,
where we will obtain starkly different conclusions. This result also highlights that our model does
not feature herding or related failures of information aggregation that can arise even under correct
perceptions. As such, it serves to isolate misperception as the sole source of the breakdown of
information aggregation that we will study in Section 4.
Lemma 1 (Information aggregation under correct perceptions). Suppose that F̂ = F . Then in any
state ω, almost all agents’ beliefs converge to a point mass on ω.
We prove Lemma 1 in Appendix A. Letting qt(ω) denote the fraction of agents that take action 0
in state ω and period t, the key idea is to prove that limt→∞ qt(ω) exists and is strictly decreasing in
15See, e.g., Hauser and Norton (2017), Norton and Ariely (2011) for evidence of under-/overestimation of wealth
inequality; Ahler (2014) for overestimation of political attitude polarization; Kunda (1999), Nisbett and Kunda (1985)
for misperceptions of numerous taste and attitude distributions in society; and Mayzlin, Dover, and Chevalier (2014)
and the references therein for the difficulties of detecting fake reviews.
16E.g., Duffie and Manso (2007); Mossel, Sly, and Tamuz (2015).
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ω, which enables agents to correctly back out the state in the long run by observing sufficiently many
actions of others. One complication is that agents’ action observations, and hence their beliefs about
the state, are private, so that calculating qt(ω) requires keeping track of the population distribution
of agents’ beliefs µωt ∈ ∆(∆(Ω)), which does not admit a tractable expression.17
Instead, we first use an inductive argument to show that qt(ω) is strictly decreasing in ω for
each t. The intuition is quite simple: First, when the realized state ω is low, more agents observe
lower private signals in period 0, and consequently, more agents choose action 0 in period 1. As a
result, more agents observe action 0 at the end of period 1, and given the first step, action 0 is more
indicative of low states than action 1. This in turn leads to more agents choosing action 0 in period
2, and so on. To use this to establish that limt→∞ qt(ω) exists and is strictly decreasing in ω, we
must additionally rule out the possibility that qt(ω) becomes very flat in ω in the limit, in which
case some states might yield the same asymptotic action frequencies and be impossible for agents
to distinguish in the limit. In Appendix A, we establish this through an analysis of the asymptotic
properties of the belief distribution µt that is based on martingale convergence arguments and the
richness of types in the population.
3.2 Single Agent Benchmark with Misperception
In the previous subsection, agents’ ability to draw correct inferences about the state from observed
actions relied on the fact that they knew the true type distribution. When agents misperceive the
type distribution to be F̂ 6= F , this introduces the possibility of misinterpreting observed actions,
in the sense that agents might have in mind an incorrect mapping from states to probabilities of
observing actions 0 or 1 at any point in time.
Nevertheless, one intuition one might have is that as long as the amount of misperception is
small, the effect of such misinterpretation will likewise be small, and agents will “approximately”
learn the true state in the long run. Our main results in Section 4 will show that this intuition is
not valid. However, to better understand the logic behind these results, it will be helpful to contrast
them with the following benchmark, where a small amount of misinterpretation of observed actions
does lead to approximately correct long-run beliefs.
Specifically, consider a single agent who observes an exogenous sequence of binary random
variables (“actions”) at ∈ {0, 1} in all periods t = 1, 2, . . .. Unlike in our original model, where
observed actions result from utility-maximizing behavior by other agents, we assume that conditional
on realized state ω, at is distributed i.i.d. over time: at takes value 0 with probability q(ω) and value
1 with complementary probability, where the mapping q : Ω→ (0, 1) from states to probabilities of
observing action 0 is continuous and strictly decreasing. To capture misinterpretation of observed
actions, we consider the possibility that the agent misperceives the mapping q to be q̂ : Ω→ (0, 1),
where q̂ is again continuous and strictly decreasing.
17In Duffie and Manso’s (2007), Duffie, Malamud, and Manso’s (2009), and Duffie, Giroux, and Manso’s (2010)
related models of learning in decentralized markets (see Section 2.4), the population distribution of posteriors can
be calculated explicitly. The methods rely on these papers’ specific assumptions about state distributions (binary or
Gaussian) and homogeneous preferences, and thus do not apply to our setting.
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A classic result due to Berk (1966) (see also Esponda and Pouzo, 2016) characterizes the agent’s
long-run beliefs in this case: Define the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between probabilities
p, p̂ ∈ (0, 1) to be KL(p, p̂) := p log(pp̂) + (1− p) log(
1−p
1−p̂). Then in any state ω, the agent’s long-run




that minimizes KL divergence between the true action 0 frequency q(ω) and the agent’s per-
ceived frequency q̂(ω̂). Note that ω̂(ω) exists and is unique for each ω, as q and q̂ are continuous
and strictly decreasing. Note also that the minimization problem can equivalently be written as
argminω̂∈Ω |q(ω)− q̂(ω̂)|, since q̂(Ω) is a continuous interval. An immediate implication is that when
the amount of misperception is small, the agent’s long-run belief is approximately correct, in the
sense that the perceived state ω̂(ω) is approximately equal to the true state ω:
Proposition 0. For any continuous and strictly decreasing q, q̂ : Ω → (0, 1), the agent’s belief
in any state ω converges almost surely to a point mass on ω̂(ω) := argminω̂∈Ω KL(q(ω), q̂(ω̂)) =
argminω̂∈Ω |q(ω)− q̂(ω̂)|, which is strictly increasing and continuous in ω. Moreover, for any δ > 0,
there exists ε > 0 such that if supω∈Ω |q̂(ω)− q(ω)| < ε, then supω∈Ω |ω̂(ω)− ω| < δ.
4 Failure of Information Aggregation under Misperception
We now return to analyzing the effect of misperception about the type distribution in the population
setting of Section 2. Our main results contrast sharply with the previous two benchmarks.
4.1 Main Results
Our first main result finds that information aggregation is highly non-robust to small amounts of
misperception. Whereas Lemma 1 established that under correct perceptions, agents eventually
learn the true state, we now show that even arbitrarily small amounts of misperception can lead
information aggregation to break down.
The breakdown we derive is very stark: Given any type distribution F , we can find an arbitrarily
small amount of misperception under which agents’ long-run beliefs are state-independent point
masses, assigning probability 1 to some fixed state ω̂ regardless of the true state ω. Moreover,
long-run beliefs are arbitrary, in the sense that any state ω̂ can arise as the long-run point-mass
belief under some arbitrarily small amount of misperception.
Theorem 1 (Discontinuous breakdown of information aggregation). Fix any F ∈ F and ω̂ ∈ Ω.
For any ε > 0, there exists a perception F̂ ∈ F with ‖F̂ − F‖ < ε under which in any state ω,
almost all agents’ beliefs converge to a point mass on ω̂.
Several prominent social learning models can give rise to unsuccessful information aggrega-
tion even when agents are correctly specified; e.g., due to the possibility of herding and/or con-
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founded learning in some sequential learning models (e.g., Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch,
1992; Banerjee, 1992).18 However, Theorem 1 generates a more extreme breakdown of information
aggregation—long-run beliefs that are state-independent point-masses—that cannot arise under any
correctly specified Bayesian learning model, because beliefs in such models follow a martingale.
Related instances where agents’ long-run beliefs grow confident in an incorrect state have been
derived in several recent papers that incorporate various forms of misspecification into sequential
learning models (e.g., Eyster and Rabin, 2010; Bohren, 2016; Gagnon-Bartsch and Rabin, 2017).
The key novelty is that Theorem 1 shows that state-independent point-mass beliefs can arise even
under vanishingly small amounts of misperception. In contrast, the aforementioned papers rely on
strong forms of misspecification;19 indeed, in a general model of misspecified sequential learning
that nests several of these types of misspecification, Bohren and Hauser (2019) show that agents
learn the true state whenever the amount of misspecification is sufficiently small. We discuss the
source of this difference in Section 7.3.
The fact that an arbitrarily small amount of misperception suffices to bring about this breakdown
is also in marked contrast to the single-agent passive-learning benchmark in Section 3.2, where we
saw that the agent’s long-run beliefs are approximately correct when the amount of misperception
is sufficiently small. We discuss the source of this contrast in Section 4.3, where we will also see
why more recent models of misspecified single-agent active learning likewise lead to approximately
successful learning under sufficiently small amounts of misperception.
As the proof sketch in Section 4.2 will illustrate, for a given type distribution F , the mispercep-
tions F̂ that give rise to the extreme breakdown in Theorem 1 are quite specific, though Section 4.4
provides natural examples of such misperceptions (e.g., underestimation of type heterogeneity). Of
course, Theorem 1 does not suggest that every misperception leads to state-independent point-
mass beliefs. Rather, the key implication is that the correctly specified model need not offer a
good approximation of a setting where agents hold even slightly incorrect beliefs about others’
characteristics. This suggests that information aggregation under misperception should be studied
independently, without relying on the predictions of the correctly specified model.
As a step in this direction, our second main result therefore investigates the effect of arbitrary
misperceptions F̂ . While in general long-run beliefs need not be fully state-independent, we show
that information aggregation continues to fail, and the failure takes the specific form of “coarse” long-
run beliefs and behavior. The result focuses on well-behaved true and perceived type distributions;
specifically, we assume that F and F̂ are analytic.20
18Herding is ruled out under either rich type heterogeneity, unbounded private signals, or rich actions (Goeree,
Palfrey, and Rogers, 2006; Smith and Sørensen, 2000; Lee, 1993). In a random matching setting, see, e.g., Banerjee
and Fudenberg (2004), Wolinsky (1990), Blouin and Serrano (2001) for correctly specified models where information
aggregation can fail.
19E.g., in Eyster and Rabin (2010) and Gagnon-Bartsch and Rabin (2017), agents naively believe that each prede-
cessor’s action reflects solely that person’s private information, fully neglecting the fact that predecessors’ behavior
also reflects their inferences from their own predecessors’ behavior.
20Function g : R→ R is analytic if it is locally given by a convergent power series; that is, for any x0 ∈ R, there is




and the right-hand side converges. As Section 4.2 illustrates, the only feature of analyticity that Theorem 2 exploits
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Theorem 2 (Coarse information aggregation). Fix any analytic F , F̂ ∈ F with F̂ 6= F . There
exists a mapping ω̂∞ : Ω → Ω that is weakly increasing and has finite range such that in any state
ω, almost all agents’ beliefs converge to a point mass on ω̂∞(ω).
Information aggregation in Theorem 2 is coarse in the following sense: Since the mapping ω̂∞
from true states ω to long-run point-mass beliefs ω̂∞(ω) is weakly increasing and has finite range,
it partitions the continuous state space Ω = [ω, ω] into finitely many intervals, and long-run point-
mass beliefs are not necessarily fully state-independent, but are constant within each of these finitely
many intervals. This prediction again contrasts with Proposition 0 from the single agent benchmark,
where the agent’s long-run belief ω̂(ω) is a strictly increasing and continuous function of ω.
As a result of agents’ coarse long-run beliefs, their long-run behavior also varies only coarsely
with the true state, remaining constant within each interval of the partition generated by ω̂∞ and
changing discretely from one interval to the next. This prediction is broadly in line with the fact
that behavior in many economic settings (e.g., firms’ pricing behavior and individuals’ consumption-
savings decisions) is not finely attuned to economic fundamentals.21 A rich theory literature provides
models of such coarse behavior that are based on the idea that individuals face limitations in their
ability to process or acquire information (e.g., Sims, 1998, 2003; Mullainathan, 2002; Jehiel, 2005;
Fryer and Jackson, 2008; Gul, Pesendorfer, and Strzalecki, 2017). Theorem 2 highlights a possible
complementary channel: Agents in our model do not face any difficulties processing their private
information, but coarse behavior emerges because agents’ misperceptions of others’ characteristics
give rise to coarse aggregation of this dispersed individual information.
The proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 appear in Appendix B. In the next subsection, we illustrate the
basic argument, which relies on the feature that agents’ learning becomes “decoupled” over time.
4.2 Illustration of Theorems 1 and 2
Step 1: Limit model. To illustrate the key ideas, Steps 1 and 2 first present and analyze a
heuristic limit model , to which we will refer back throughout the paper. In Step 3 below, we will
show that this limit model approximates agents’ long-run beliefs and behavior in the original model,
allowing us to translate the conclusions obtained in the limit model back into the original model.
We first consider an arbitrary perception F̂ . The limit model differs from the original model
solely in assuming that at the end of each period t ≥ 1, each agent meets not one, but infinitely
many other agents and observes their period t actions. By an exact law of large numbers, this
means that in any state ω all agents perfectly learn the fraction qt(ω) of actions 0 that is played in
the population in period t.
In period 1, all agents play the action that maximizes their expected utility given their period 0
private signal. Because of this, if perception F̂ = F is correct, then by observing q1(ω) at the end of
period 1, all agents can correctly back out the true state ω. From period 2 on, agents then follow a
is that analytic F̂ 6= F can intersect at most finitely many times on any compact interval; the theorem remains valid
even if F̂ , F are not analytic but have this feature.
21See, e.g., Reis (2006a,b) and references therein.
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threshold strategy with threshold θ∗(ω), where types above (respectively, below) θ∗(ω) play action
1 (respectively, action 0). Observing this behavior in each period is consistent with agents’ belief
that the state is ω.
Suppose next that F̂ 6= F . Since all agents believe F̂ to be the true type distribution (and believe
this to be common certainty), observing q1(ω) at the end of period 1 leads agents to commonly
believe in some state ω̂1(ω). Since F̂ 6= F , ω̂1(ω) need not equal ω, though by a similar reasoning
as in Section 3.2, |ω̂1(ω)− ω| is negligible when ‖F̂ − F‖ is sufficiently small. Given their belief in
ω̂1, in period 2, agents then follow a threshold strategy with threshold θ∗1 := θ∗(ω̂1).
A key departure from the correct perceptions case arises at the end of period 2. This takes
the form of a possible inconsistency between expected behavior and actual observations: Given
perception F̂ , all agents assign probability 1 to observing fraction F̂ (θ∗1) of actions 0 at the end of
period 2. However, since the true type distribution is F 6= F̂ , agents’ actual observation at the end
of period 2 is q2(ω) = F (θ∗1), which typically does not equal F̂ (θ∗1).
The limit model postulates that agents react to such possible “contradictions” as follows: Upon
observing fraction qt(ω) of action 0 at the end of any period t ≥ 2, all agents update beliefs to assign







State ω̂t is chosen to best explain observation qt under perception F̂ , in the sense of minimizing
KL-divergence between qt and the fraction F̂ (θ∗(ω̂t)) of actions 0 that agents would have expected
to observe if ω̂t had been common certainty in period t.
Given the updated belief that the state is ω̂t, in period t + 1, agents then follow the threshold
strategy with cutoff θ∗t := θ∗(ω̂t) and at the end of the period again face a possible discrepancy
between expected behavior F̂ (θ∗t ) and actual behavior F (θ∗t ). Starting with ω̂1 as derived above,





F (θ∗t−1), F̂ (θ
∗(ω̂))
)
with θ∗t−1 = θ
∗(ω̂t−1). (1)
We briefly note two features of (1). First, except for boundary cases, the adjusted belief ω̂t
satisfies F̂ (θ∗(ω̂t)) = F (θ∗t−1), so that beliefs at the end of each period t perfectly explain the behavior
that was observed in the current period. But, importantly, each belief adjustment is followed by
a corresponding adjustment in next period’s behavior, which leads to a new discrepancy between
expected and actual behavior, triggering yet another belief adjustment. This feature contrasts with
the single-agent passive learning benchmark in Section 3.2, where observed action frequencies qt(ω)
in each period were exogenous and hence were unaffected by changes in the belief about the state,
but is also present in recent models of single-agent active learning (e.g., Heidhues, Koszegi, and
Strack, 2018). However, Step 2 will highlight a key distinction between our setting and both types
of single-agent models.
Second, the belief adjustment process (1) is of course heuristic, as it involves switching from
assigning probability 1 to state ω̂t−1 at the beginning of period t to assigning probability 1 to the
possibly different state ω̂t at the end of period t. However, as we shall see in Step 3, in the long
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Figure 2: Left: Starting with any point-mass belief ω̂1, agents face a discrepancy between expecting to observe
fraction F̂ (θ∗(ω̂1)) of actions 0 and actually observing F (θ∗(ω̂1)). In response, they adjust beliefs to a point mass on
ω̂2, which perfectly explains the latter observation. But following this adjustment, next-period behavior is governed by
threshold θ∗(ω̂2), giving rise to another discrepancy between expected and actual behavior F̂ (θ∗(ω̂2)) and F (θ∗(ω̂2)).
The process of adjustments continues, converging to the unique belief ω̂ under which expected and actual behavior
coincide. Right: An example with three steady states ω̂∞, ω̂′∞, ω̂′′∞.
run this adjustment process approximates the Bayesian belief dynamics in the original model: For
large t, agents’ beliefs in the original model are “close” to point-mass beliefs on ω̂t−1 and ω̂t at the
beginning and end of period t, but beliefs retain full support throughout, so that agents do not face
any “contradictions” and belief-updating is always well-defined.
Step 2: Long-run beliefs and decoupled learning. We now consider long-run beliefs in
the limit model. To illustrate Theorem 1, we first consider a particular choice of F̂ and F , where
F is arbitrary and F̂ crosses F from below at a single point θ∗ = θ∗(ω̂) with ω̂ ∈ Ω, as shown in
the left-hand panel of Figure 2. Example 2 in Section 4.4 provides an interpretation in terms of
underestimation of population heterogeneity. As explained in Figure 2, starting at any state ω̂1, the
ω̂t-process in (1) must converge to the limit belief ω̂ that corresponds to the crossing point of F̂ and
F . Thus, even though, as noted in Step 1 above, the period 1 belief ω̂1 depends on the true state ω
(and indeed is arbitrarily close to ω when the amount of misperception is small), agents’ long-run
belief assigns probability 1 to the same fixed state ω̂ regardless of the true state ω. Moreover,
observe that by suitably choosing F̂ , both the amount of misperception ‖F̂ − F‖ and the long-run
belief ω̂ ∈ Ω can be arbitrary. Together with the justification of the limit model in Step 3, these
observations will establish Theorem 1.22
To illustrate Theorem 2, we next consider long-run beliefs for arbitrary F and F̂ . Let
SS(F, F̂ ) :=
{








denote the set of steady states of process (1). It is easy to show that any steady state ω̂∞ satisfies
22From this, it is clear that Theorem 1 does not rely on the use of the total variation distance. It remains
valid under any norm on F with the feature that for any ω̂, there are perceptions F̂ that are arbitrarily close to
F but cross F only once from below at θ∗(ω̂). Such norms include the sup norm, all Lp norms, the C1 norm
(‖F̂ − F‖C1 := supθ∈R |F̂ (θ)− F (θ)|+ supθ∈R |F̂ ′(θ)− F ′(θ)|), etc.
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either F (θ∗(ω̂∞)) = F̂ (θ∗(ω̂∞)) or ω̂∞ ∈ {ω, ω}; thus, steady states either feature no discrepancy
between the true and perceived fraction of actions 0 or are boundary points of the state space.
Moreover, based on the observation that ω̂t+1 is increasing in ω̂t for all t, we can show that in any
state ω, process (1) converges to some ω̂∞(ω) ∈ SS(F, F̂ ), where ω̂∞(ω) is weakly increasing in ω.
Finally, observe that when F and F̂ are analytic with F̂ 6= F , then F and F̂ coincide in at most
finitely many points on the compact interval [θ∗(ω), θ∗(ω)].23 As a result, SS(F, F̂ ) is finite; the
right-hand panel of Figure 2 provides an example in which there are three steady states. Thus,
process (1) yields a weakly increasing and finite-ranged map ω̂∞ : Ω→ Ω from realized states ω to
limit beliefs ω̂∞(ω) ∈ SS(F, F̂ ). Together with Step 3, this will establish Theorem 2.
Before proceeding to Step 3, we summarize the key feature driving both Theorems 1 and 2: This
is that agents’ learning becomes decoupled from the true state ω in the long run, as is captured
by the fact that the set of steady states in (2) depends on F and F̂ , but does not depend on
ω. Intuitively, this reflects that, over time, agents’ belief-updating places less and less weight on
own initial private signals and increasingly more weight on observations of others’ behavior, but
(unlike private signals) others’ behavior depends on the true state only indirectly through others’
beliefs.24 As a result, agents’ long-run inferences are driven entirely by the way in which they
interpret observed actions. Under correct perceptions, decoupling leads to SS(F, F ) = Ω; that is,
all states are steady states regardless of ω, but successful information aggregation is nevertheless
possible, because initial private signals determine which steady state long-run beliefs converge to.
By contrast, when agents even slightly misperceive the type distribution, then as we have seen, the
set of steady states can be very limited, because only few states might allow agents to reconcile
observed actions with their perceptions. Thus, depending on the nature of misperception, long-run
beliefs either depend only coarsely on the true state (as in Theorem 2), or are even fully independent
of ω (as in Theorem 1).
As we discuss in Section 4.3, this decoupling mechanism distinguishes our social learning setting
from both the single-agent passive learning benchmark in Section 3.2, as well as recent models of
misspecified single-agent active learning.
Step 3: Justifying the limit model. Finally, we return to the original model and sketch
why in the long run, belief-updating and behavior are approximated by the limit model. In the
original model, each agent’s observations up to period t+1 consist of a random sample (a1, . . . , at) of
other agents’ actions in periods 1 through t. Belief updating in this model is more complicated than
adjustment process (1) for two main reasons: First, agents’ inference problem is not time-stationary;
second, due to sampling noise, observations (and hence beliefs) differ across agents.




τ=1 aτ of actions that each agent observes. First, since each agent believes that his perception
F̂ is correct and is shared by everyone, he believes (by Lemma 1) that the population learns the
true state in the long run and that behavior converges to the corresponding threshold strategy.
23This follows from the principle of permanence for analytic functions; see footnote 53.
24Indeed, in the limit model (though not in our original model), belief-updating becomes decoupled from the true
state starting in period 2, as adjustments from ω̂t−1 to ω̂t in (1) are independent of the realized ω in all periods t ≥ 2.
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Based on this, Lemma B.2 shows that for large enough t, āt provides an approximate sufficient
statistic for each agent’s inferences; moreover, inferences are approximately time-stationary, in the
sense that each agent’s time t posterior, while having full support, is close to a point-mass belief
on the state argminω̂ KL(1− āt, F̂ (θ∗(ω̂)) that best explains āt under perception F̂ . Second, most
agents’ observed empirical frequencies āt, and hence their beliefs, are very similar in the long run.
Specifically, let qτ (ω) denote the true action 0 share in the population at time τ . Then, based on a
law of large numbers argument, Lemma B.3 shows that in the long run, an arbitrarily large fraction
of agents observes 1−āt that is arbitrarily close to the true time average share q̄t(ω) := 1t
∑t
τ=1 qτ (ω)
of action 0, where q̄t(ω) converges.25
Combining these two observations, Proposition B.1 shows that for large t, most agents’ belief
updating is approximated by the following sequence of commonly held point-mass beliefs ω̂t and
behavior in the population is close to the corresponding threshold strategy:








where the approximation “≈” becomes arbitrarily precise as t → ∞. Since q̄t(ω) converges and









i.e., an approximate version of the updating process (1) in the limit model. In particular, beliefs in
the original model must converge to steady states as given by (2).
4.3 Discussion of Theorems 1 and 2
Persistence of misperceptions. In contrast with the heuristic updating process in the limit
model, agents in our model are Bayesian and assign positive probability to every finite action
sequence; thus, they never encounter any “contradictory” information in finite time. Nevertheless,
one might wonder whether in the limit as agents accumulate infinitely many observations, they
should realize that their perception is incorrect. There is a sense in which this is not the case.





τ=1 aτ converge precisely to the prediction 1 − F̂ (θ∗(ω̂∞)) under their limit belief.26
This suggests that misperceptions in this environment can be a relatively persistent phenomenon.
Comparison with single-agent learning. Section 3.2 discussed a benchmark model of single-
agent passive learning. In addition, more recent papers (e.g., Nyarko, 1991; Heidhues, Koszegi, and
Strack, 2018, 2019; He, 2018) study the effect of misspecification in single-agent environments with
active learning, where the agent’s actions influence the distribution of signals he observes in each
period. However, just as the passive learning benchmark, all aforementioned models again differ
25Here the law of large numbers applies since conditional on each state ω, each agent’s action observations
(a1, . . . , at) are independently (although not identically) distributed over time.
26This observation is an analog of Proposition 6 in Heidhues, Koszegi, and Strack (2018).
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from ours in that long-run beliefs under small enough amounts of misspecification are approximately
correct. Below we illustrate that this is due to the fact that, as long as the signal technology satisfies
an identification assumption, single-agent learning does not become decoupled from the true state.
At the same time, Section 7.2 points to natural single-agent settings where identification failures in
the signal technology give rise to decoupled learning and shows that this can lead to similar fragility
results as we found above.
To see the idea, consider an abstract model of single-agent active learning: In each period
t = 1, 2, . . ., the agent chooses an action xt ∈ X = [0, 1] to maximize his expected state-dependent
payoff given his belief µt ∈ ∆(Ω) about the state. Assume for simplicity that the optimal action
x∗(µ) is unique for each current belief µ ∈ ∆(Ω), and write x∗(ω) := x∗(δω). At the end of each
period t, the agent observes a signal at ∈ {0, 1}, where the probability q(xt, ω) that at = 0 depends
both on the true state ω and his period-t action xt.27 Upon observing at, the agent updates
his belief about the state. However, in so doing, he perceives mapping q : X × Ω → (0, 1) to
be q̂ : X × Ω → (0, 1), where q and q̂ are continuous in both arguments. The passive learning
benchmark corresponds to the special case where q and q̂ do not depend on x.
Assume that q(x, ω) and q̂(x, ω) are strictly decreasing in ω for all x, so that both true and
perceived signal probabilities uniquely identify the state under each action. This is analogous to
our assumption under passive learning that q, q̂ : Ω→ (0, 1) are strictly decreasing in ω, and is also
satisfied by the aforementioned active learning models. Then, as in Section 4.2, we can consider a
limit model where the agent observes not one, but infinitely many draws of signals each period, and
we can set up a process of point-mass beliefs analogous to (1).28 As before, the steady states ω̂∞
of this process minimize the discrepancy between the actual and perceived probabilities of signal 0:
SS(q, q̂) =
{
ω̂∞ ∈ Ω : ω̂∞ ∈ argmin
ω̂∈Ω




with equality q(x∗(ω̂∞), ω) = q̂(x∗(ω̂∞), ω̂∞) at interior steady states. However, the key difference
with (2) is that the set of steady states in (3) depends on the true state ω. This reflects that belief-
updating in this model does not become decoupled from the true state in the long run, because
even asymptotically, the actual signal observations q(x∗(ω̂∞), ω) depend directly on ω, providing
an “anchor.” In particular, in contrast with our observation that SS(F, F ) = Ω in Section 4.2,
the correctly specified case q̂ = q now has the true state ω as its unique steady state. Under mild
regularity conditions which ensure that the implicit function theorem applies, this implies that small
amounts of misperception continue to yield steady states (and hence long-run beliefs) that are close
27We assume that action set X is the unit interval and signals at are binary in order to make this model as
analogous as possible to our model, where x∗(ω̂) corresponds to the aggregate action frequency F (θ∗(ω̂)) and at to
the observation of a random agent j’s action ajt. However, neither assumption is essential for the points we make.
28Specifically, the agent chooses his first action x∗1 based on his prior and arrives at a point-mass belief in the
unique state ω̂1 that best explains the observed signal frequency q(x∗1, ω) given his perception q̂. In all subse-
quent periods t, given initial belief ω̂t−1, he chooses action x∗t = x∗(ω̂t−1), but then faces a discrepancy between
expected and observed signal frequencies q̂(x∗t , ω̂t−1) and q(x∗t , ω), to which he responds by updating his belief to
ω̂t = argminω̂∈Ω KL (q(x
∗




to the truth; see Supplementary Appendix E.1.
Misperceptions about signal distributions. Theorems 1 and 2 have considered misper-
ceptions about the type distribution F , while assuming that agents are correctly specified about
the distributions Φ(·|ω) of private signals. Focusing on the limit model in Section 4.2, we briefly
illustrate that incorporating misperceptions about Φ(·|ω) in addition to misperceptions about F
would not affect our results; by contrast, if agents correctly perceive the type distribution and only
(commonly) misperceive Φ(·|ω) to be some Φ̂(·|ω), then long-run beliefs are approximately correct
under small enough amounts of misperception.29 Intuitively, this reflects the fact that long-run in-
ferences are based on observed behavior rather than initial private signals and hence do not depend
on Φ̂. Indeed, in the limit model, Φ̂ only affects which belief ω̂1 agents reach at the end of period
1; in all periods t ≥ 2, behavior follows a threshold strategy with respect to the current belief ω̂t−1,
and hence the perceived type distribution F̂ is all that matters for agents’ inferences. If F̂ = F ,
then agents do not further adjust their period-1 belief ω̂1, and the latter is close to ω when Φ̂ is
close to Φ. If F̂ 6= F , then regardless of Φ̂, agents’ belief process continues to follow (1), yielding
the same set of steady states SS(F, F̂ ) as before and leaving Theorems 1 and 2 unaffected.
Interpretation of discontinuity and countervailing forces. While Theorem 1 exhibits a
stark discontinuity of long-run beliefs to small amounts of misperception, our preferred interpretation
of this result places less emphasis on the formal discontinuity than on the substantive implication
that slight misperceptions can have a large negative impact on social learning. Indeed, below we
highlight two countervailing forces that render long-run beliefs continuous in F̂ , but show that when
these forces are weak this substantive implication is unaffected:
Repeated private signals. As in much of the social learning literature, we have assumed that each
agent has access to a single private signal about ω, and our results are unaffected if agents receive
private signals in finitely many periods.30 On the other hand, if agents receive private signals in all
periods, then one can show that agents’ long-run beliefs ω̂∞(ω) depend on the true state ω and vary
continuously with F̂ ; intuitively, this setting is a hybrid of social learning and single-agent passive
learning, and as discussed above, belief dynamics in the latter do not become decoupled from the true
state over time. However, whenever agents’ repeated private signals are sufficiently uninformative,
we obtain an approximate analog of Theorem 1, where for any ω̂ there exist arbitrarily small amounts
of misperception F̂ such that agents’ long-run beliefs ω̂∞(ω) in each state are arbitrarily close to a
point mass on ω̂.31 Thus, whenever agents’ dominant source of information is social learning rather
than private signals, the basic insight that slight misperceptions of others’ characteristics can have
29Theorems 1–2 are also unaffected if agents have an incorrect common prior Ψ̂ over states, and in this case
information aggregation is successful if F̂ = F .
30If private signals are costly, then agents might choose to acquire only finitely many signals under certain classes
of cost functions (e.g., Ali, 2018; Burguet and Vives, 2000).
31More formally, suppose agents receive i.i.d. signal draws from Φ(·|ω) in all periods. For any analytic F, F̂ , similar
reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 2 shows that agents’ long-run beliefs are given by state-dependent point-mass
beliefs ω̂∞(ω) ∈ argminω̂ KL(F (θ∗(ω̂∞(ω)), F̂ (θ∗(ω̂))) + KL(Φ(·|ω),Φ(·|ω̂)). Then a similar logic as for Theorem 1
shows that for any F , ω̂, and ε > 0, there exists F̂ with ‖F̂ − F‖ < ε and δ > 0 such that if ‖Φ(·|ω)− Φ(·|ω)‖ < δ,
then in all states ω, almost all agents’ beliefs converge to a point mass on some ω̂∞(ω) ∈ [ω̂ − ε, ω̂ + ε].
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a large negative impact on information aggregation remains valid.32
Finite horizon. Following much of the literature on information aggregation, our analysis focuses
on asymptotic beliefs. Given any finite horizon t, it is not difficult to see that the distribution
µωt of agents’ posteriors is continuous in F̂ . Nevertheless, analogous to the previous paragraph,
Theorem 1 immediately entails that even under arbitrarily small amounts of misperception, µωt can
be arbitrarily close to a Dirac measure on the state-independent point-mass δω̂ if t is large enough.
One implication is that, under misperception, halting agents’ interactions after a certain number
of periods may improve ex-ante expected payoffs; this is not the case for correctly specified social
learning models (even in the presence of herding).
4.4 Examples: Nature of Misperception Shapes Long-Run Beliefs
As we have argued, a key implication of Theorem 1 is that information aggregation under mis-
perception should be studied in its own right, without relying on the predictions of the correctly
specified benchmark. In characterizing long-run beliefs under any (analytic) F and F̂ as steady
states SS(F, F̂ ) of process (1), the proof of Theorem 2 provides a starting point for studying how
the nature of agents’ misperception shapes their long-run beliefs. In the following, we illustrate this
for two natural forms of misperception.
Example 1 (First-Order Stochastic Dominance and “Fake” Recommenders). We first
consider the possibility that the true type distribution first-order stochastically dominates agents’
perceptions or vice versa, so that agents systematically under- or overestimate the share of types
above any given level. As discussed in Section 2.4, one natural example of this is word-of-mouth
communication about a new product where agents underestimate the share of “fake” recommenders.
Fake recommenders can be modeled as types θ ≥ θ∗(ω) who take action 1 (“recommend”) irrespective
of the true quality of the product; underestimating their share then naturally corresponds to F̂
being first-order stochastically dominated by F .33 In the correctly specified model of Section 3.1,
the presence of fake recommenders has no long-run effect, as agents continue to learn the true state.
By contrast, the following result shows that fake recommendations can be a highly effective
tool for manipulating consumers’ beliefs, suggesting a possible rationale for the prevalence of this
marketing strategy: As long as consumers slightly underestimate the share of such recommendations,
their presence can lead to drastic overoptimism about the quality of the product, in the sense that
long-run beliefs are a point mass on the highest quality ω, regardless of the true quality ω.
For this result, it is sufficient that F strictly first-order stochastically dominates F̂ on
the set Θ∗ := (θ∗(ω), θ∗(ω)); that is, F (θ) < F̂ (θ) for all θ ∈ Θ∗, which we denote by F FOΘ∗ F̂ .
Indeed, all types below θ∗(ω) (resp., above θ∗(ω)) have dominant action 0 (resp., 1), so that agents’
perceptions about the relative type distributions outside Θ∗ are irrelevant.
32Likewise, if some fraction of agents ignore others’ actions and act solely based on their initial private signals, the
same approximate analog of Theorem 1 holds whenever this fraction is small.
33Concretely, suppose that the true type distribution F = βP + (1− β)G is a convex combination of a distribution
P of “promotional” types whose support is contained in [θ∗(ω),+∞) and a full-support distribution G of “genuine”
types; and suppose that F̂ = β̂P + (1− β̂)G where β̂ < β.
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Figure 3: Overoptimism under FOSD. When F FOΘ∗ F̂ , beliefs in all states converge to a point mass on ω.
Corollary 1 (Overoptimism/-pessimism). Fix any F, F̂ ∈ F . If F FOΘ∗ F̂ (respectively, F̂ FOΘ∗
F ), then in any state ω, almost all agents’ beliefs converge to a point mass on ω (respectively, ω).
Figure 3 shows the intuition in the limit model. When agents underestimate the share of types
above any given level, then under any belief about the state, they are surprised by the lower than
expected frequency of action 0. They respond with continual upward adjustments to their beliefs
about the state, converging eventually to a point mass on the unique steady state ω. 
Example 2 (Under-/Overestimation of Population Heterogeneity). Another widely doc-
umented form of misperception is that in many contexts, individuals tend to underestimate type
heterogeneity in society.34 We capture this by means of the commonly used dispersiveness order
(Shaked and Shanthikumar, 2007), whereby F is more dispersive than F̂ if F−1(x) − F−1(y) ≥
F̂−1(x) − F̂−1(y) for all type quantiles x, y ∈ (0, 1) with x > y; we denote this by F %disp F̂ .
For example, under Gaussian distributions F ∼ N (µ, σ2), F̂ ∼ N (µ̂, σ̂2), this takes the simple
parametric form that perceived type variance σ̂2 is lower than actual variance σ2. We rule out the
possibility that F FOΘ∗ F̂ or F̂ FOΘ∗ F , as this is covered by Corollary 1 above.
The following result shows that underestimation of population heterogeneity leads to conser-
vative long-run beliefs, in the sense that beliefs in all states converge to a point mass on an interior
state ω̂ ∈ (ω, ω):
Corollary 2 (Conservative beliefs). Fix any analytic F, F̂ ∈ F with F̂ 6= F such that F̂ , F are
not strictly first-order stochastic dominance ranked on Θ∗. If F %disp F̂ , then there exists some
ω̂ ∈ (ω, ω) such that in any state ω, almost all agents’ beliefs converge to a point mass on ω̂.
Intuitively, when agents underestimate type heterogeneity, they overestimate the sensitivity of
the population action distribution against the state, because in any state, they expect different
agents to take more similar actions than they actually do. As a result, their belief updates after
34For example, several studies (e.g., Norton and Ariely, 2011; Engelhardt and Wagener, 2015) find systematic
underestimation of wealth inequality in many countries.
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Figure 4: Left: Underestimation of population heterogeneity leads to conservative long-run beliefs. Right: Overes-
timation leads to extreme beliefs.
observing others’ actions are more “sluggish” than they should be, leading to conservatism in long-
run beliefs. More formally, Figure 4 (left) shows that Corollary 2 corresponds to a setting where F̂
crosses F from below in a single point θ∗(ω̂) that corresponds to an interior state ω̂ ∈ (ω, ω). As
we saw in the proof sketch of Theorem 1, this implies SS(F, F̂ ) = {ω̂}. The same conclusion as
in Corollary 2 can also arise in the context of fake product recommendations, if in addition to the
fake positive recommenders in Example 1, there are fake negative recommenders (modeled as types
θ ≤ θ∗(ω)), and agents underestimate the share of both fake types.35
In other contexts, people are found to overestimate population heterogeneity.36 This corresponds
to F̂ %disp F , where we again assume that F̂ , F are not first-order stochastic dominance ranked on
Θ∗. As illustrated in Figure 4 (right), in this case F̂ crosses F from above in a single point θ∗(ω̂)
with ω̂ ∈ (ω, ω), and the limit model predicts convergence to the extreme beliefs ω and ω in almost
all states ω.37 
5 Rich vs. Coarse State Spaces
In this section, we show that a key determinant of the fragility of information aggregation to mis-
perception is how rich a space of uncertainty agents face. We also discuss some design implications
of this finding. Throughout, we fix some countably infinite set of states {ω1, ω2, ...} that is dense in
Ω = [ω, ω] and let Ωn := {ω1, ..., ωn} for each n.
The following result makes two points. First, for any fixed finite state space Ωn (with arbitrary
35Extending footnote 33, suppose the true type distribution is F = βP + γN + (1 − β − γ)G, where N is the
distribution of “negative promotional” types with suppN ⊆ (−∞, θ∗(ω)], while F̂ = β̂P + γ̂N + (1 − β̂ − γ̂)G with
β̂ < β, γ̂ < γ. Then F̂ crosses F from below in a single point in Θ∗ provided (β+γ− β̂− γ̂) (G(θ∗(ω))−G(θ∗(ω))) >
γ − γ̂; this holds whenever the genuine type distribution G puts high enough mass on non-dominant types.
36See, e.g., Ahler (2014) in the context of perceived political attitudes.
37Note that, in addition to ω, ω, the set of steady states (2) also includes ω̂. Thus, Theorem 2 only implies that
agents’ long-run beliefs in the original model are given by a weakly increasing mapping ω̂∞ : Ω→ {ω, ω̂, ω}. However,
steady state ω̂ is unstable under the limit model dynamics, because in almost all states ω, (1) converges to either ω
or ω. Given this, we conjecture that in the original model ω̂∞(ω) likewise takes values ω or ω in almost all states ω.
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full-support prior Ψn ∈ ∆(Ωn)), information aggregation is robust, in the sense that if the amount
of misperception is small enough agents learn the true state in Ωn. Second, however, the larger the
state space Ωn, themore sensitive information aggregation is to small amounts of misperception, and
in the limit as n→∞, we obtain an approximate analog of the extreme breakdown of information
aggregation in Theorem 1:
Theorem 3 (Finite state space). Fix any F ∈ F .
1. Fix any Ωn. There exists εn > 0 such that under any perception F̂ ∈ F with ‖F̂ − F‖ < εn
and in any state ω ∈ Ωn, almost all agents’ beliefs converge to a point mass on ω.
2. Fix any ω̂ ∈ Ω. For any ε > 0, there exists N and a perception F̂ ∈ F with ‖F̂ − F‖ < ε
under which for any state space Ωn with n ≥ N and in any state ω ∈ Ωn, almost all agents’
beliefs converge to a point mass on some ω̂∞(ω) ∈ [ω̂ − ε, ω̂ + ε].
The second part of Theorem 3 offers an approximate analog of Theorem 1 in the following sense:
For any ω̂, Theorem 1 exhibits arbitrarily small amounts of misperception such that agents’ long-
run belief is a state-independent point mass on ω̂. In the present setting, agents’ beliefs converge
to a point mass on ω̂∞(ω), which may depend on the true state ω. However, Theorem 3 exhibits
arbitrarily small amounts of misperception such that in all large enough state spaces Ωn, agents’
long-run belief ω̂∞(ω) is arbitrarily close to a state-independent point mass on ω̂. An immediate
implication is that in the first part of Theorem 3, the amount of misperception εn below which
information aggregation is successful in Ωn shrinks to 0 as n→∞.
We prove Theorem 3 in Appendix C. To see the intuition for the first part, suppose that n = 2.
Consider the limit model from Section 4.2, whose conclusions can again be shown to approximate
those of the original model in the long run. Just as in the continuous state setting, after observing
the action frequency in the population at the end of period 1, all agents again commonly believe
in some state ω̂1; and as summarized by equation (1), from period 2 on, agents play threshold
strategies according to their current point-mass beliefs ω̂t and adjust these beliefs at the end of
each period to explain the observed action frequency in that period under their misperception F̂ .
Analogous to the continuous state case, ω̂1 again depends on the true state ω and converges to ω
as ‖F̂ − F‖ → 0; in the binary state setting, this means that ω̂1 in fact equals the true state when
F̂ is sufficiently close to F .
However, the key difference with the continuous state setting concerns belief adjustments from
period 2 on. In the continuous setting, whenever F̂ (θ∗(ω̂1)) 6= F (θ∗(ω̂1)), then (ignoring bound-
ary cases) agents can find some new point-mass belief ω̂2 that better explains observed behavior
F (θ∗(ω̂1)); that is, even small discrepancies between expected and observed behavior trigger a
sequence of belief adjustments and corresponding adjustments in behavior, as we highlighted in
Section 4.2.
By contrast, in the binary state setting, whenever the amount of misperception is sufficiently
small, agents do not further adjust their beliefs in period 2 and beyond. To see this, suppose, say,
that ω̂1 = ω1, so that observed behavior in period 2 is F (θ∗(ω1)). Then, even though expected
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Figure 5: The limit model with a binary state space Ω = {ω1, ω2}. When ω̂t = ω1, then for small enough amount
of misperception, actual behavior F (θ∗(ω1)) is better explained by expected behavior F̂ (θ∗(ω1)) under the true state
ω1 than by expected behavior F̂ (θ∗(ω2)) under the only other state ω2.
behavior F̂ (θ∗(ω1)) under ω1 does not perfectly match this observed behavior, there is only one
other possible state ω2, and when ‖F̂ −F‖ is sufficiently small, expected behavior F̂ (θ∗(ω2)) under
ω2 will be even farther from F (θ∗(ω1)) than under ω1. This is illustrated in Figure 5. Thus,
the binary state setting is robust to small amounts of misperception, because small discrepancies
between expected and observed behavior do not trigger adjustments to beliefs about the state.
Given the coarseness of the state space, believing in the true state ω is sustainable, as the behavior
this gives rise to cannot be better explained by any other state.
However, the second part of Theorem 3 implies that as the state space becomes richer, the
amount of misperception ε under which information aggregation remains successful becomes smaller
and smaller. Intuitively, any discrepancy between observed and expected behavior is more likely to
trigger a belief adjustment the more alternative states there are that could explain this discrepancy.
In the limit as the number of states approaches infinity, ε shrinks to 0, thus effectively restoring the
conclusion of Theorem 1.
Many settings of economic interest naturally feature rich state spaces, from safety levels of new
products to market fundamentals in decentralized trade settings. In such settings, an important
implication of Theorem 3 is that there can be a benefit to “simplifying” agents’ learning environment,
for instance by making their private information or their payoffs less sensitive to fine details of the
fundamentals. The following example illustrates this point in the context of public news releases.38
Example 3 (Benefits of undetailed public news). Suppose that agents’ period 0 private in-
formation is obtained in the following manner. Similar to Myatt and Wallace (2014), there is a
benevolent sender (e.g., a central bank or consumer protection agency) that acquires and truthfully
communicates information about the state of the world (e.g., market fundamentals or the safety
of a new product) subject to two frictions: First, there may be limits on the sender’s ability to
38An analogous example can illustrate the benefits of trading “simpler” financial assets; see Example 4 in the
previous working paper version, Frick, Iijima, and Ishii (2019b).
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acquire information; second, there is some “receiver noise,” in that any given news release might be
interpreted differently by different agents.
This is modeled as follows. First, in each state ω ∈ Ω = [ω, ω], the sender observes a signal
σ(ω) ∈ R, where σ : Ω → R is weakly increasing; here the partition Πσ := {σ−1(m) : m ∈ R}
of Ω represents the sender’s possibly imperfect information about the state. Second, the sender
communicates his signal σ(ω), but each agent observes this signal with some idiosyncratic noise;
specifically, agent i observes signal si = σ(ω) + ηi, where ηi is drawn i.i.d. across agents and states
from a mean zero distribution with positive log-concave density on R.39 The induced private signal
distributions Φ(si|ω) = Pr(σ(ω)+ηi ≤ si) are measurable with respect to the sender’s partition Πσ.
Thus, a strictly increasing σ (i.e., a perfectly informed sender) corresponds to the continuous state
space setting of Section 2, while if σ has finite range, then the setting is isomorphic to one with a
finite state space where each state corresponds to a cell of Πσ.
If in all subsequent periods t ≥ 1 agents draw inferences from each other’s behavior as in our
model in Section 2, then our analysis implies the following. If agents are correct about the type
distribution F , then the better informed the sender (i.e., the finer Πσ) the better this is for long-run
learning, as agents’ beliefs converge to a point mass on the correct cell of Πσ; in particular, if and
only if the sender is perfectly informed, agents always learn the exact state. By contrast, if agents’
perception F̂ is even slightly incorrect, this gives rise to the following new trade-off: On the one
hand, the finer Πσ, the more precise is agents’ long-run information about the state if aggregation
is successful; but on the other hand, information aggregation is more sensitive to misperception and,
at worst, may break down completely. As a result, worse informed senders (i.e., coarser partitions
Πσ) can be better. Moreover, even if a benevolent sender has access to precise information about
the state, he has a rationale to commit not to fully release it (as might be achieved, e.g., by central
banks establishing a reputation for “vague” or “undetailed” announcements).40 
6 More General Perceptions
So far, we have assumed that all agents share the same perception F̂ of the the type distribution
and that this is common certainty among agents. Under this assumption, agents’ first-order beliefs
about F may be incorrect, but their higher-order beliefs (about other agents’ beliefs about F and
others’ beliefs about others’ beliefs about F etc.) are correct.41 Thus, Theorem 1 highlights that
slightly incorrect first-order beliefs are enough to generate extreme departures from the correctly
specified model.
At the same time, an important question in many models featuring agents that are in some way
39Log-concave densities of ηi ensure that signal distributions satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property. We
assume for simplicity that ηi does not vary across different sender signal technologies σ. Introducing such variation
does not affect our conclusions, as long as ηi always has full support.
40This rationale for vague communication is complementary to ones based on strategic externalities across agents
(e.g. Morris and Shin, 2002) or between sender and receiver (e.g., Crawford and Sobel, 1982).
41This setting also has the feature that when F̂ is close to F , then agents’ hierarchy of beliefs is close (in the
product topology) to the correctly specified setting where there is common certainty of F .
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“non-standard” is how such agents interact with standard and sophisticated agents, who are aware
of the presence of these non-standard agents. In Section 6.1, we investigate this question in our
setting by incorporating a fraction of agents who know the true type distribution. We show that
there are learning externalities between the two groups of agents that give rise to a new form of non-
robustness: Information aggregation is highly sensitive to sophisticated agents’ second-order beliefs.
In addition, Section 6.2 briefly discusses other generalizations of our baseline model of perceptions.
6.1 Interaction between Correct and Incorrect Agents
Specifically, we now extend our baseline model so that (independently of types) fraction α ∈ [0, 1]
of agents (referred to as incorrect agents) misperceive the type distribution to be F̂ and believe
that F̂ is common certainty among all agents. The remaining fraction 1−α of agents know the true
type distribution F and are aware of the presence of incorrect agents and their beliefs. However,
we allow for the possibility that they may be (slightly) wrong about the fraction of incorrect agents
in the population; specifically, they perceive this fraction to be α̂. We refer to this second group of
agents as correct if α̂ = α and quasi-correct if α̂ 6= α. Our baseline model corresponds to the
case where α = 1.
We first show that correct agents, who exactly know the fraction of incorrect agents, are able
to learn the true state in the long run. Moreover, correct agents exert a positive externality on the
learning of incorrect agents: In contrast with the baseline model, incorrect agents are now able to
approximately learn the true state as long as their amount of misperception is sufficiently small.42
Proposition 1. Fix any α̂ = α < 1.
1. Fix any F ∈ F . Under any F̂ ∈ F and in any state ω, almost all correct agents’ beliefs
converge to a point mass on ω.
2. Fix any analytic F ∈ F and any δ > 0. There exists ε > 0 such that under any analytic
F̂ ∈ F with ‖F̂ − F‖ < ε and in any state ω, almost all incorrect agents’ beliefs converge a
point mass on some state ω̂∞(ω) with |ω̂∞(ω)− ω| < δ.
However, consider next the case of quasi-correct agents, who slightly misperceive the fraction
of incorrect agents. Then Proposition 1 breaks down, and now it is the incorrect agents who exert
a negative externality on quasi-correct agents’ learning. Specifically, the following result extends
Theorem 1 by showing that the presence of incorrect agents with an arbitrarily small amount of
misperception can lead to state-independent and arbitrary long-run beliefs among both groups of
agents; moreover, for this to occur, the fraction α > 0 of incorrect agents can be arbitrarily small
and quasi-correct agents’ perception α̂ of this fraction can be arbitrarily close to the truth, as long
as α̂ 6= α.
42Note that Lemma 1 follows as a special case of Proposition 1 with α = 0. Note also that Proposition 1 holds
for α arbitrarily close to 1. Thus, even an arbitrarily small fraction of sophisticated agents is enough to enable
incorrect agents to approximately learn the state. However, similar to Theorem 3, it can be shown that incorrect
agents’ learning is more sensitive to misperception the smaller the fraction of sophisticated agents, so that ε in part
(2) shrinks to 0 as α→ 1.
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Proposition 2. Fix any F ∈ F , ω̂ ∈ Ω, and α̂, α > 0 with α̂ 6= α. For any ε > 0, there exists
F̂ ∈ F with ‖F̂ − F‖ < ε such that in any state ω, almost all (quasi-correct and incorrect) agents’
beliefs converge to a point mass on ω̂.
The proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 appear in Supplementary Appendix D. The intuition behind
Proposition 1 is that since correct agents know the fraction of incorrect agents, their knowledge
of F and F̂ allows them to back out the true state from observed behavior in the long run, just
as in Lemma 1. Given this, the fact that correct agents’ long-run behavior depends on the true
state ω provides an anchor for incorrect agents’ belief-updating even asymptotically, similar to the
discussion of repeated informative private signals in Section 4.3.
By contrast, in Proposition 2, even if quasi-correct agents are only slightly wrong about α,
then despite knowing the true type distribution and incorrect agents’ misperception, they too face
discrepancies between actual and anticipated behavior. This gives rise to an analogous belief ad-
justment process as in Section 4.2. Moreover (ignoring boundary cases), incorrect and quasi-correct
agents’ steady states (ω̂I∞, ω̂C∞) under this process must coincide: Indeed, when α̂ 6= α, this is the
only way for quasi-correct agents not to face a discrepancy between the actual action 0 frequency
αF (θ∗(ω̂I∞)) + (1 − α)F (θ∗(ω̂C∞)) and their expected frequency α̂F (θ∗(ω̂I∞)) + (1 − α̂)F (θ∗(ω̂C∞)).
As a result, for any F̂ 6= F , long-run outcomes are exactly the same as if there were only incorrect
agents, yielding the above generalization of Theorem 1. Theorem 2 can be generalized analogously.
6.2 Other Perceptions
We briefly comment on further extensions of our baseline model of perceptions.
Heterogeneous perceptions. While our baseline model assumes that agents share the same
misperception F̂ , it might be more realistic to allow each agent i to hold his own misperception
F̂i, in the sense that he believes the true type distribution to be F̂i and (erroneously) believes
this to be common certainty among the population. For example, the false-consensus effect (Ross,
Greene, and House, 1977) finds a positive association between people’s own characteristics and
their perceptions of others’ characteristics. Generalizing Theorems 1 and 2 to such heterogeneous
perceptions is not difficult, and the only main difference is that this extension naturally gives rise
to heterogeneous long-run beliefs (i.e., disagreement).43 Notably, even when agents’ perceptions F̂i
are on average correct (i.e., equal to F ), their average long-run belief can be highly incorrect (e.g.,
state-independent or a coarse function of the state).
43To see this, consider the limit model from Section 4.2. Let λ ∈ ∆(R × F) denote the joint distribution over
types and perceptions in the population, with marginal margRλ over types given by F . For each F̂ ∈ F and fraction
q ∈ [0, 1] of action 0, define ω̂(q; F̂ ) = argminω̂ KL(q, F̂ (θ∗(ω̂))). Then the fraction qt of action 0 in the population
evolves according to qt+1 = λ({(θ, F̂ ) : θ∗(ω̂(qt; F̂ )) > θ}) =: g(qt). Note that transition function g is independent
of the realized state; as a result, learning is again decoupled. Since g is increasing, qt converges to one of the steady
states of the system. Generalizing Theorem 1, if g crosses the identity function at a single point q∗ from above,
then limt qt = q∗ regardless of the true state ω, which implies that agents’ (heterogeneous) long-run beliefs are state-
independent; and this can occur even when all misperceptions in the support of λ are arbitrarily close to F . Likewise,
coarse information aggregation arises when g crosses the identity finitely many times on [0, 1].
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Higher-order perceptions. A further generalization of the setting in the previous paragraph
is when agents are (partially) aware of the fact that others hold different perceptions.44 While the
general analysis of this case is beyond the scope of our paper, slight misspecifications of higher-
order perceptions can also lead to discontinuous break-downs of information aggregation, as we
have demonstrated for the hybrid model with correct and incorrect perceptions above.
Nondegenerate perceptions. Finally, as is common in the misspecified learning literature, we
have assumed throughout that agents’ perceptions are point-mass beliefs on particular distributions
F̂ , so that agents do not update their perceived type distributions. A more general form of misspec-
ification might involve agents holding a (common) prior belief over some set of type distributions,
with support F̂ ⊆ F that does not contain the true distribution F ; agents then update these beliefs
(as well as their beliefs about ω) over time. A full analysis of this case is again beyond the scope of
the current paper, but it is not difficult to construct arbitrarily small perturbations of the correctly
specified model that feature nondegenerate misperceptions yet yield the same extreme breakdown
of information aggregation as in Theorem 1.
A substantially different setting is when the support F̂ contains the true type distribution F . In
this case, agents are correctly specified (under common priors), which falls outside the focus of this
paper and rules out such extreme breakdowns of information aggregation as the state-independent
point-mass beliefs in Theorem 1. However, medium-run predictions (at any fixed period t) under
this model approximate those in our baseline model with common F̂ whenever agents’ prior places
sufficiently high probability on a small neighborhood of F̂ . It is also worth noting that learning in
this setting can be subject to an identification problem, as there are typically many combinations
of states and type distributions that are consistent with the same observed action distributions,
leading to the possibility of incomplete long-run learning.
7 Concluding Discussion
This paper has highlighted a natural learning environment where small amounts of misperception
can lead long-run beliefs and behavior to depart significantly from the correctly specified bench-
mark. While we have made this point in the context of a particular social learning model where
agents misperceive others’ characteristics, we view our results as further motivating the study, both
empirically and theoretically, of relevant misperceptions in other learning environments. To illus-
trate that our fragility finding and the decoupling mechanism that drives it are not limited to our
specific environment, we briefly discuss some other settings that can give rise to similar results.
7.1 Beyond misperceptions of others’ characteristics
First, remaining within the social learning model of this paper, agents might misperceive features
of the environment other than the type distribution F . While information aggregation is robust
to some such misperceptions (see the discussion of misperceptions about signal distributions in
44See Bohren and Hauser (2019) for such a formulation in the context of a sequential social learning model.
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Section 4.3), others lead to analogous fragility results as in the current paper. We briefly discuss
two examples, focusing on steady states for simplicity.
Misperceptions about action sampling technology. Consider an extension of our model,
in which agents’ probability of observing action 0 in state ω and period t is given by g(qt(ω)), where
qt(ω) denotes the true share of action 0 in the population and g : (0, 1) → (0, 1) is a continuous
and strictly increasing function that captures a potentially distorted action sampling technology, for
instance, due to greater salience of one of the actions.45 In such a setting, agents might naturally
misperceive g to be some other mapping ĝ : (0, 1) → (0, 1), for example, because they fail to
fully take into account the sampling distortion. This gives rise to an analogous limit model as in
Section 4.2, where (interior) steady states must again yield no discrepancy between the actual and
perceived shares of action 0 observations, i.e.,
g(F (θ∗(ω̂∞))) = ĝ(F̂ (θ
∗(ω̂∞))).
Based on this it is easy to see that, even if agents are correct about the type distribution (F̂ = F ),
misperceiving the sampling technology leads to analogs of Theorems 1 and 2. For example, if action
0 is less salient than action 1 but agents even slightly underestimate the extent to which this is the
case (i.e., g(q) < ĝ(q) < q for all q ∈ (0, 1)), then long-run beliefs are a point mass on the highest
state ω, regardless of the true state ω.
Misperceptions about matching technology. Consider another extension that incorporates
assortativity into the random matching technology. Formally, the matching technology P (·, ·) is
given by a symmetric, continuous and full-support distribution over R × R whose marginal is the
type distribution F , and each period, each agent i of type θi randomly meets an agent j whose
type is drawn from the conditional distribution P (·|θi). We assume that (i) P (·|θ) %FO P (·|θ′) for
all θ ≥ θ′, that is, reflecting assortativity, higher types are more likely than lower types to meet
other high types; and (ii) P (θ|θ) is strictly increasing in θ.46 Our baseline model with independent
random matching is the special case where P = F × F .
In such a setting, it may be natural for agents to misperceive the matching technology to be
some P̂ 6= P . Supplementary Appendix E.2 sets up a limit model analogous to Section 4.2. The
key novelty is that, even if all types share the same perception P̂ , (interior) steady states are now
given by type-dependent point-mass beliefs ω̂θ∞: Specifically, agents follow a threshold strategy with
a cutoff θ∗∞ that satisfies P (θ∗∞|θ∗∞) = P̂ (θ∗∞|θ∗∞), and each type θ’s steady-state belief ω̂θ∞ ensures
that there is no discrepancy between θ’s true and perceived probability of observing action 0, i.e.,
P (θ∗∞|θ) = P̂ (θ∗(ω̂θ∞)|θ).
If P (θ|θ) and P̂ (θ|θ) cross only once, then the cutoff type θ∗∞ and steady-state beliefs ω̂θ∞ are
unique; thus, analogous to Theorem 1, long-run beliefs are independent of the true state, regardless
45Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004) study such distorted sampling, but assume that agents are aware of the distortion.
46This condition is satisfied by many parametric families of P , for example, when P is bivariate Gaussian.
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of the amount of agents’ misperception. A natural misperception that can give rise to this is when
agents are correct about the type distribution, but underestimate the extent of assortativity.47
Supplementary Appendix E.2 formalizes this in a Gaussian setting and shows that it leads the
state-independent beliefs ω̂θ∞ to be increasing in types, in line with empirical evidence on positive
association between agents’ preferences and beliefs.48
7.2 Single-agent active learning with identification failures
In Section 4.3, we illustrated by looking at steady states, that single-agent learning does not become
decoupled when the signal technology satisfies an identification assumption. Our companion paper,
Frick, Iijima, and Ishii (2019c), analyzes learning dynamics in a general class of misspecified learning
environments that nests single-agent active learning and presents formal belief-convergence results.
Just as importantly, however, our companion paper points to natural single-agent settings where,
as a result of identification failures in the signal technology, learning does become decoupled, and
we show that this leads to similar fragility results as in the current paper.
To illustrate, consider the same active learning model as in Section 4.3, but suppose that for
some action x∅, true and perceived signal distributions are completely uninformative, in the sense
that q(x∅, ω) =: q∅ and q̂(x∅, ω) =: q̂∅ are both constant in ω. Moreover, suppose that whenever
the agent’s belief is a point mass on any particular state ω̂, then his optimal action is x∗(ω̂) = x∅.
In Frick, Iijima, and Ishii (2019c), we highlight that such an identification failure, which we term
“non-identification at point-mass beliefs” (NIP), is natural in costly information acquisition settings,
where the agent may choose to stop acquiring information whenever he is confident in any given
state. Observe that, under this identification failure, the set of steady states in (3) becomes
SS(q, q̂) =
{
ω̂∞ ∈ Ω : ω̂∞ ∈ argmin
ω̂∈Ω










Hence, in contrast with (3) but as in (2), the set of steady states does not depend on the true state ω.
This reflects that under non-identification at point-mass beliefs, single-agent learning also becomes
decoupled, in that long-run observations q(x∗(ω̂∞), ω) = q∅ are no longer tied to ω. However, there
is one important difference with the fragility mechanism in the current paper: Whereas Theorem 1
relied on misperceptions for which SS(F, F̂ ) consists of a single state ω̂, the present identification
failure leads SS(q, q̂) to always include all states in Ω. Thus, determining which steady states beliefs
converge to requires substantially different techniques, which we develop in Frick, Iijima, and Ishii
(2019c). Using these techniques, we show that, similar to Theorem 1, arbitrarily small amounts of
misperception can again lead the agent’s belief to converge to a point mass on the same fixed state
ω̂, regardless of the true state ω (see Section 6.2 of Frick, Iijima, and Ishii, 2019c).
47Frick, Iijima, and Ishii (2019a) study the implications of such “assortativity neglect” in static coordination games.
48See, e.g., Bullock, Gerber, Hill, and Huber (2013) in the context of partisan bias in factual beliefs about politics.
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7.3 Social learning with public action observations
In the present paper, agents learn by privately observing random other agents’ actions, analogous to
other aforementioned models of social learning through decentralized random interactions. At the
same time, other canonical social learning models feature learning based on public observations. For
example, in sequential social learning models a countable sequence of agents each choose one-shot
actions after observing all previous agents’ actions, and in Vives (1993), agents observe a public
signal (e.g., a market price) of the aggregate action frequency qt each period.
The framework in Frick, Iijima, and Ishii (2019c) can also be applied to study the impact
of misperceptions in such models. We again show that information aggregation is highly fragile
and that vanishingly small amounts of misperception about others’ characteristics can lead beliefs
to converge to a state-independent point-mass.49 At the same, public observations lead to some
differences in both the fragility mechanism and qualitative predictions. Specifically, just as in the
current paper, belief-updating under public observations becomes decoupled from the true state,
because agents’ long-run inferences are based only on observed actions; however, while in the current
paper agents regard long-run action observations as highly indicative of the state, with public
observations agents view new actions as uninformative in the long run, because asymptotically
agents’ actions are based purely on the public belief rather than additional private information.
This gives rise to a similar identification failure as in Section 7.2, as a result of which all states
are steady states. At a qualitative level, we show that under public observations, information
aggregation is fragile even in finite state spaces, in contrast with our findings in Section 5.
Finally, we note that these fragility results contrast with Bohren (2016) and Bohren and Hauser’s
(2019) finding that information aggregation is robust to small amounts of misperception in closely
related sequential social learning environments. The difference stems from their assumption that
agents observe repeated exogenous public signals about the state (or, alternatively, that a fraction of
“autarkic” agents act solely based on their private signals). Analogous to the discussion of repeated
private signals in Section 4.3, this assumption implies that belief-updating never becomes decoupled
from the true state; however, as long as the public signal is sufficiently uninformative (or the fraction
of autarkic agents is sufficiently small), one can again establish approximate analogs of our fragility
results.
49See Section 6.3 of Frick, Iijima, and Ishii (2019c), in the context of sequential social learning. To isolate the
effect of misperception, we again consider a setting where due to rich type heterogeneity, information aggregation is
successful when agents are correctly specified.
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Appendix: Main Proofs
A Proof of Lemma 1
We make use of the following additional notation. For any belief H ∈ ∆(Ω), let θ∗(H) denote the
type that is indifferent between action 0 and 1; that is,
´
(u(1, ω, θ∗(H))−u(0, ω, θ∗(H)))dH(ω) = 0.
By the assumptions on u, such a type exists and is unique and θ∗(H) is continuous in H under
the topology of weak convergence. As in the main text, we let θ∗(ω) denote θ∗(δω). Given any
private signal s, let Hs ∈ ∆(Ω) denote the Bayesian update of H after observing s. Note that if H
is not a Dirac measure, then by the assumptions on signal distributions Φ, Hs strictly first-order
stochastically dominates Hs′ for any s > s′, which implies that θ∗(Hs) < θ∗(Hs′).
In each state ω and at the beginning of each period t ≥ 1, let µωt ∈ ∆(∆(Ω)) denote the
population distribution of agents’ posteriors. Note that the distribution of posteriors is independent




Finally, let µ̄t ∈ ∆(∆(Ω)) denote the hypothetical population distribution of posteriors when
agents update beliefs only based on observing actions and do not take into account their private
signals in period 0. More precisely, each agent observes actions aτ in periods τ = 1, . . . , t− 1 that
are generated according to qτ (ω) defined above, and agents update their beliefs assuming that aτ
is distributed according to qτ . Given this, we can also express qt as
qt(ω) =
ˆ ˆ
F (θ∗(Hs))dΦ(s|ω)dµ̄ωt (H). (4)
A.1 Agents’ Long-Run Behavior
The following four lemmas establish that (on some measure 1 set of states), limt→∞ qt(ω) exists and
is strictly decreasing in ω. The first lemma proves that qt is strictly decreasing at all finite times.
Lemma A.1. For each t, qt(ω) is strictly decreasing in ω and satisfies qt(ω) ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. The claim that qt(ω) ∈ (0, 1) is clear from the fact that types above θ∗(ω) always choose
action 1 and types below θ∗(ω) always choose action 0. To show that it is strictly decreasing in ω,
we proceed by induction on t. For t = 1, this follows from (4) and the fact that µ̄ω1 = δΨ and Φ(·|ω)
is strictly increasing in ω with respect to first-order stochastic dominance. Suppose next that the
claim holds for all periods up to and including t and consider period t+ 1.
Let Ψs,at ∈ ∆(Ω) denote the posterior belief of an agent who observes private signal s and action
sequence at = (a1, ..., at) ∈ {0, 1}t. Note that Ψs,a
t has full support on Ω, since qτ (ω) ∈ (0, 1) for all
τ = 1, .., t and all ω (so that at occurs with positive probability in each state) and by the full-support










































F (θ∗(Hs))dΦ(s|ω∗∗)dµ̄ω∗∗t+1(H) = qt+1(ω∗∗).
Here, the first inequality holds since θ∗(Hs) is strictly decreasing in s for each H in the support
of µ̄ω∗t+1 and since Φ(·|ω∗) strictly first-order stochastically dominates Φ(·|ω∗∗). For the second
inequality, note that since qt(ω) is strictly decreasing in ω, Ψs,a
t−1,1 strictly first-order stochastically
dominates Ψs,at−1,0. Thus, θ∗(Ψs,at−1,1) < θ∗(Ψs,at−1,0), which together with qt(ω∗) < qt(ω∗∗) yields
the second inequality. Iterating this argument yields the remaining inequalities.
To prove that qt remains strictly decreasing in ω in the limit as t → ∞, Lemmas A.2 and
A.3 first consider the limit of the hypothetical belief distribution µ̄ωt that is based only on action
observations. Using standard arguments, Lemma A.2 shows this limit exists almost surely:
Lemma A.2. There exists a set of states Ω∗ ⊆ Ω such that Ψ(Ω∗) = 1 and the weak convergent
limit µ̄ω∞ := limt µ̄ωt exists for all ω ∈ Ω∗.
Proof. To formalize any agent’s belief updating based only on observing sequences of actions (not
private signals), consider the probability space (Ω̄,A,P). Here Ω̄ := Ω × {0, 1}∞ is a Polish space
(endowed with the product topology) that encodes the realized state ω ∈ Ω and action sequences
a∞ = (a1, a2, ...) ∈ {0, 1}∞, A denotes the corresponding Borel algebra, and measure P satisfies
P
(








(1− qtj (ω))xj + qtj (ω)(1− xj)
)
dΨ(ω)
for every Borel set E ⊆ Ω, t1, . . . , tk ∈ N, and x1, . . . , xk ∈ {0, 1}. For each finite action sequence
at ∈ {0, 1}t, Bayesian updating based on P induces an agent’s posterior H(·|at) ∈ ∆(Ω) over
states after observing at. Since Ω and {0, 1}∞ are both Polish, the posterior belief H(·|a∞) ∈ ∆(Ω)
conditional on each infinite sequence a∞ ∈ {0, 1}∞ is also well-defined (see Theorem 9.2.2 in Stroock,
2010).
Define the filtration It := σ (a1, . . . , at) ⊆ A that describes an agent’s information at the end of
each period t. Let I∞ :=
⋃∞
t=0 It ⊆ A. For each Borel set E ⊆ Ω, Lévy’s upwards theorem applied
to the indicator function on E guarantees that as t → ∞, H(E|at) = E[1ω∈E |It] → E[1ω∈E |I∞] =
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H(E|a∞) holds P-almost surely (see Corollary 5.2.4 in Stroock, 2010). By standard arguments, this
implies that H(·|at) converges weakly to H(·|a∞) P-almost surely.
Thus, there is a set of states Ω∗ ⊆ Ω with P(Ω∗ × {0, 1}∞) = Ψ(Ω∗) = 1 such that conditional
on each ω ∈ Ω∗, H(·|at) converges weakly to H(·|a∞) P-almost surely. Consider any ω ∈ Ω∗.
Since µ̄ωt ∈ ∆(∆(Ω)) is the distribution of H(·|at) conditional on ω and since conditional on ω,
H(·|at) converges to H(·|a∞) P-almost surely, this implies that µ̄ωt converges weakly, with limit
µ̄ω∞ ∈ ∆(∆(Ω)) given by µ̄ω∞(H) = P [H(·|a∞) ∈ H|ω] for any Borel set H ⊆ ∆(Ω).
For Ω∗ as in Lemma A.2, the following lemma shows that for each ω ∈ Ω∗, µ̄ω∞ assigns probability
1 to limit posteriors that contain the true state ω in their support.
Lemma A.3. For any ω ∈ Ω∗, µ̄ω∞({H : suppH 3 ω}) = 1.
Proof. Fix any ω ∈ Ω∗. It suffices to prove the following claim: For any non-empty intervals
E,E′ ⊆ Ω with E closed in Ω and E′ open in Ω such that either (i) ω ≤ inf E < supE ≤ inf E′ or
(ii) supE′ ≤ inf E < supE ≤ ω, we have
µ̄ω∞
(
{H : H(E) = 0 and H(E′) > 0}
)
= 0.
To see that this claim implies Lemma A.3, note that for eachH such that ω 6∈ suppH, we have for
some n that eitherH ∈ H+n := {H ′ : H ′([ω, ω+ 1n ]) = 0 and H
′((ω+ 1n , ω]) > 0} orH ∈ H
−
n := {H ′ :
H ′([ω − 1n , ω]) = 0 and H
′([ω, ω − 1n)) > 0}. But by the above claim, µ̄
ω,C
∞ (H+n ) = µ̄
ω,C
∞ (H−n ) = 0
for all n. Hence, by countable additivity of µ̄ω∞, µ̄ω∞({H : suppH 63 ω}) = 0.
To prove the claim, we only consider case (i); the proof for case (ii) is analogous. Consider any
agent and conditional on realized state ω, let (Ht) denote the process of his hypothetical posterior
beliefs that are based only on observing actions (without taking into account his private signal).
By the proof of Lemma A.2, (Ht) weakly converges with probability 1, and the limit posterior is
distributed according to µ̄ω∞.
Consider the process Wt := Ht(E′)/Ht(E), which is well-defined at every t since the posterior
Ht always has full support. We have




































∈ (0, 1) denote the probabilities of observing
action 0 conditional on events E and E′, and the inequality holds because qt(ω) > qt(E) > qt(E′)
by the assumption that ω ≤ inf E < supE ≤ inf E′ and since qt(ω′) is strictly decreasing in ω′
(Lemma A.1). Thus, Wt is a non-negative supermartingale conditional on ω.
By the martingale convergence theorem, there exists some W∞ ∈ L1 such that conditional on
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′) > 0⇒ lim sup
t→∞
Ht(E) > 0.
By weak convergence of (Ht) and the Portmanteau theorem, this yields the desired claim.
Based on Lemma A.3, we now establish that on Ω∗, qt remains strictly decreasing in the limit.
Lemma A.4. For any ω ∈ Ω∗, q∞(ω) := limt qt(ω) exists and is strictly decreasing in ω.
Proof. Recall from (4) that qt(ω) =
´ ´
F (θ∗(Hs))dΦ(s|ω)dµ̄ωt (H), where
´
F (θ∗(Hs))dΦ(s|ω) is
continuous and bounded in H. Thus, since µ̄ωt weakly converges to µ̄ω∞ on Ω∗, limt qt(ω) exists for




To show that q∞ is strictly decreasing, take any ω∗, ω∗∗ ∈ Ω∗ such that ω∗ > ω∗∗. If µ̄ω
∗
∞ = δδω∗
and µ̄ω∗∗∞ = δδω∗∗ , then q∞(ω
∗) = F (θ∗(ω∗)) < F (θ∗(ω∗∗)) = q∞(ω
∗∗). Thus, suppose that either
µ̄ω
∗
∞ 6= δδω∗ or µ̄
ω∗∗
∞ 6= δδω∗∗ . We consider the case when µ̄
ω∗





F (θ∗(Hs))dΦ(s|ω∗)dµ̄ω∗∞ (H) <
ˆ ˆ




F (θ∗(Hs))dΦ(s|ω∗∗)dµ̄ω∗t (H) ≤ lim
t→∞
ˆ ˆ
F (θ∗(Hs))dΦ(s|ω∗∗)dµ̄ω∗∗t (H) = q∞(ω∗∗).
For the first inequality, note that since µ̄ω∗∞ 6= δδω∗ , Lemma A.3 implies that µ̄
ω∗
∞ assigns posi-
tive measure to beliefs H that are not Dirac measures. Since for non-Dirac H, θ∗(Hs) is strictly
decreasing in s, the inequality follows from the fact that Φ(·|ω∗) strictly first-order stochastically
dominates Φ(·|ω∗∗). The second inequality holds because by the proof of Lemma A.1, we have´ ´
F (θ∗(Hs))dΦ(s|ω∗∗)dµ̄ω∗t (H) <
´ ´
F (θ∗(Hs))dΦ(s|ω∗∗)dµ̄ω∗∗t (H) for all t.
A.2 Completing the Proof
To complete the proof, we show that in all states, almost all agents’ beliefs converge to a point-mass
on the true state. The next lemma first shows this for states ω ∈ Ω∗.
Lemma A.5. µ̄ω∞ = δδω for each ω ∈ Ω∗.
Proof. Fix any ω ∈ Ω∗ and any interval E′ := [ω−, ω+] 63 ω. Consider any agent and let (Ht) denote
the process of his posterior beliefs in state ω when he updates beliefs based only on observing others’
actions. It suffices to show that Ht(E′)→ 0 almost surely.50
50Indeed, since process (Ht) almost surely weakly converges and its limit is distributed according to µ̄ω∞, the
Portmanteau theorem then implies that µ̄ω∞({H : H(Eo) = 0}) = 1, where Eo denotes the interior of E′ in Ω.
In particular, letting H+n = {H : H((ω + 1n , ω]) > 0} and H
−

















= 0, as required.
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We focus on the case ω < ω− < ω+, as the other case ω− < ω+ < ω is analogous. Without loss,
we assume that ω− ∈ Ω∗, as otherwise we can expand E′ by selecting a point from (ω, ω+) ∩ Ω∗ as
the new lower-bound of E′. Pick any ω∗ ∈ Ω∗ such that ω < ω∗ < ω− and let E := [ω, ω∗].
Now consider the process of likelihood ratios Wt :=
Ht(E′)
Ht(E)
. As in the proof of Lemma A.3, this
process is a non-negative supermartingale. Thus, there is an L1-random variable W∞ such that

























if at = 1. Since limt→∞ qt(ω−) < limt→∞ qt(ω∗) by Lemma A.4 , there exist γ > 0 and T such that∣∣∣∣Wt+1Wt − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≥ γ
for all t ≥ T at all histories. This ensures that W∞ = 0 almost surely (as otherwise the convergence
Wt →W∞ does not occur). Therefore, Ht(E′)→ 0 almost surely, as required.
Lemma A.5 implies that q∞(ω) = F (θ∗(ω)) and µωt weakly converges to δδω for any ω ∈ Ω∗.
Now take any ω ∈ Ω \ Ω∗. By Lemma A.1, we have the inequalities
F (θ∗(ω′)) = lim
t→∞
qt(ω
′) ≥ lim sup
t→∞





′′) = F (θ∗(ω′′))
for any ω′, ω′′ ∈ Ω∗ such that ω′ < ω < ω′′. If ω ∈ (ω, ω) is interior, then since Ψ(Ω∗) = 1 and Ψ
admits a positive density, we can choose ω′, ω′′ ∈ Ω∗ arbitrarily close to ω. Hence, by continuity of F
and θ∗, we have qt(ω)→ F (θ∗(ω)). For boundary points ω ∈ {ω, ω}, the same argument shows that
lim inft→∞ qt(ω) ≥ F (θ∗(ω)) and lim supt→∞ qt(ω) ≤ F (θ∗(ω)). Since qt(·) ∈ [F (θ∗(ω)), F (θ∗(ω))],
this again implies qt(ω)→ F (θ∗(ω)) and qt(ω)→ F (θ∗(ω)). Thus, q∞(·) := limt→∞ qt(·) = F (θ∗(·))
exists and is strictly decreasing on the whole of Ω. Given this, for any ω ∈ Ω\Ω∗, the same argument
as in the proof of Lemma A.5 shows that µ̄ω∞ = δδω . Hence, µωt weakly converges to δδω .
B Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2
We prove Theorems 1 and 2 in Sections B.3 and B.4, respectively. Both proofs follow from prelimi-
nary results on agents’ long-run inferences and beliefs that we establish in Sections B.1 and B.2, in
particular Proposition B.1, which shows that long-run beliefs are steady states of the limit model
belief adjustment process that we considered in Section 4.2.
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B.1 Agents’ Long-Run Inferences
In this section, we first consider any agent whose perception is given by F̂ and study his inferences
from sequences of observed actions at−1 = (a1, . . . , at−1). The key result is Lemma B.2, which shows
that the average action āt−1 = 1t−1
∑t−1
τ=1 aτ that the agent observes up to time t− 1 provides an
“approximate” sufficient statistic for the agent’s belief as t→∞.
Let q̂t(ω) denote the agent’s perceived fraction of action 0 in each period t and state ω. Since
the agent believes that F̂ is the true type distribution and that F̂ is common certainty among all
agents, Lemma 1 and all lemmas used in its proof in Appendix A apply to the agent’s perceptions
of behavior and beliefs in the population. In particular, Lemma 1 implies that the agent believes
that in all states ω almost all agents’ beliefs converge to a point mass on the true state ω. Thus, the
agent believes that behavior in state ω converges to a threshold strategy according to θ∗(ω); that
is, q̂∞(ω) := limt→∞ q̂t(ω) = F̂ (θ∗(ω)) for each ω. Additionally, Lemma A.1 implies that q̂t(·) is
strictly decreasing for each t. Hence, since F̂ (θ∗(·)) is continuous on the compact interval Ω = [ω, ω],
it follows that q̂t(·) converges to F̂ (θ∗(·)) uniformly.
Let Ht(· | at−1, s) ∈ ∆(Ω) denote the agent’s posterior belief after observing private signal s and
action history at−1 = (a1, . . . , at−1). Because q̂t(ω) ∈ (0, 1) for each t and ω (Lemma A.1) and by
the full-support assumption on private signals, Ht(· | at−1, s) has full support over Ω with positive
density ht(· | at−1, s) for all at−1 and s . For each pair of states ω′, ω′′, denote the corresponding
log likelihood ratio by
`t(ω
′, ω′′ | at−1, s) := log ht(ω
′ | at−1, s)
ht(ω′′ | at−1, s)
.
Let `1(ω′, ω′′) denote the log likelihood ratio based on the prior belief.
Lemma B.1 below will provide a lower bound on the log likelihood ratio that depends on histories
at−1 only through the average action āt−1 and holds uniformly across all pairs of states. To state
this, we first choose some ν∗ > 0 and C < 0 < C such that q̂∞(ω) ± ν∗ ∈ (0, 1) for all ω and such




1− F̂ (θ∗(ω))− ν
1− F̂ (θ∗(ω)) + ν
, log
F̂ (θ∗(ω))− ν






1− F̂ (θ∗(ω))− ν
1− F̂ (θ∗(ω)) + ν
, log
F̂ (θ∗(ω))− ν
F̂ (θ∗(ω)) + ν
}
< C.
Such values exist since q̂∞(ω) = F̂ (θ∗(ω)) ∈ [F̂ (θ∗(ω)), F̂ (θ∗(ω))] for each ω and 0 < F̂ (θ∗(ω)) <
F̂ (θ∗(ω)) < 1. Moreover, for any ν ∈ [−ν∗, ν∗], R ∈ [0, 1] and R′, R′′ ∈ [F̂ (θ∗(ω)), F̂ (θ∗(ω))], we
define
∆ν(R,R′, R′′) := R log
R′ − ν
R′′ + ν








′, ω′′ | at−1, s) ≥ `1(ω′, ω′′)+log
φ(s | ω′)
φ(s | ω′′)
+(C−C)(t̂−1)+(t− t̂)∆ν(1− āt−1, q̂∞(ω′), q̂∞(ω′′)).
Proof. Since q̂t converges to q̂∞ uniformly, we can choose t̂ such that for all t ≥ t̂, we have
supω∈Ω |q̂t(ω) − q̂∞(ω)| < ν. Pick any t ≥ t̂, any ω′ 6= ω′′, any private signal s, and any
at−1 = (a1, . . . , at−1). Then
`t(ω





































1− q̂∞(ω′′) + ν
)










1− q̂∞(ω′′) + ν
)
− C(t̂− 1)
= (C − C)(t̂− 1) + (t− t̂)
(





1− q̂∞(ω′′) + ν
)
= (C − C)(t̂− 1) + (t− t̂)∆ν(1− āt−1, q̂∞(ω′), q̂∞(ω′′)),
as required. Here the first inequality holds because by choice of C, we have for all τ = 1, . . . , t̂− 1
that

















The second inequality holds by choice of t̂. The third inequality holds because by choice of C, we











1− F̂ (θ∗(w))− ν
1− F̂ (θ∗(w)) + ν
, log
F̂ (θ∗(w))− ν
F̂ (θ∗(w)) + ν
}
< C.
And the final two equalities hold by definition of āt−1 and ∆ν .
Using Lemma B.1, we now show that for large t, the agent’s belief is approximately a point mass
on the state ω̂ = minω̂′ KL(1 − āt−1, q̂∞(ω̂′)) that minimizes KL-divergence between the observed
empirical frequency 1− āt−1 of action 0 and the agent’s perceived long-run fraction of action 0.
Lemma B.2. Fix any s ≤ s and R ∈ (0, 1). Let ω̂ := argminω̂′ KL(R, q̂∞(ω̂′)). Then for every
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E | at−1, s
)
: s ∈ [s, s], 1− āt−1 ∈ [R− ε,R+ ε]
}
= 1.
Proof. Note that since the agent’s posterior admits a positive density, Ht(E | at−1, s) = Ht(E◦ |
at−1, s) for all t, at−1, and s, where E◦ is the interior of the interval E. Since E◦ is an open interval,
E◦ = (α1, α2) for some α1 < α2 with ω ≤ α1 < α2 ≤ ω. Let R1 := q̂∞(α1) and R2 := q̂∞(α2).
There are three cases to consider:
1. ω̂ ∈ (α1, α2) and R = q̂∞(ω̂),
2. ω̂ = α2 = ω and R ≤ q̂∞(ω̂),
3. ω̂ = α1 = ω and R ≥ q̂∞(ω̂).
We illustrate the argument only for case 1 as it translates easily to the other cases.51 Moreover,
in case 1, we can assume that ω < α1 < ω̂ < α2 < ω, by restricting to a subset of E if need be.
Then we can choose ξ, ε, ρ > 0 such that R2 < R− ξ < R+ ξ < R1 and
ρ < inf
{





∆0(R′, R′′, R′′′) : R′ ∈ [R− ε,R+ ε], R′′ ∈ [R,R+ ξ], R′′′ ≥ R1
}
.
By continuity of KL-divergence, there exists some ν ∈ (0, ν∗) such that
ρ < inf
{





∆ν(R′, R′′, R′′′) : R′ ∈ [R− ε,R+ ε], R′′ ∈ [R,R+ ξ], R′′′ ≥ R1
}
.
Take M > 0 such that −M ≤ `1(ω′, ω′′) + log φ(s|ω
′)
φ(s|ω′′) for all ω
′, ω′′ ∈ [ω, ω] and all s ∈ [s, s].
Let t̂ be the cutoff given by Lemma B.1. Then for all t ≥ t̂, ω′ ∈ [ω̂, q̂−1∞ (R− ξ)], ω′′ ∈ q̂−1∞ ([0, R2]),
s ∈ [s, s], and any at−1 such that 1− āt−1 ∈ [R− ε,R+ ε], we have
`t(ω
′, ω′′ | at−1, s) ≥ `1(ω′, ω′′) + log
φ(s | ω′)
φ(s | ω′′)
+ (C − C)(t̂− 1) + (t− t̂)∆ν(1− āt−1, q̂∞(ω′), q̂∞(ω′′))
≥ −M + (C − C)(t̂− 1) + (t− t̂)ρ,
where the first inequality holds by Lemma B.1 and the second inequality holds by choice of ν and
M above. Likewise, for all t ≥ t̂, ω′ ∈ [q̂−1∞ (R + ξ), ω̂], ω′′ ∈ q̂−1∞ ([R1, 1]), s ∈ [s, s], and any at−1
51In case 2, we choose ξ, ε, ρ > 0 such that q̂∞(ω) < R+ ξ < R1 and
ρ < inf
{
∆0(R′, R′′, R′′′) : R′ ∈ [R− ε,R+ ε], R′′ ∈ [R,R+ ξ], R′′′ ≥ R1
}
.
Finally, in case 3, we choose ξ, ε, ρ > 0 such that R2 < R− ξ < q̂∞(ω) and
ρ < inf
{
∆0(R′, R′′, R′′′) : R′ ∈ [R− ε,R+ ε], R′′ ∈ [R− ξ,R], R′′′ ≤ R2
}
.
The remaining steps are analogous to case 1.
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such that 1− āt−1 ∈ [R− ε,R+ ε], we have
`t(ω
′, ω′′ | at−1, s) ≥ −M + (C − C)(t̂− 1) + (t− t̂)ρ.
As a result, for all t ≥ t̂, s ∈ [s, s], and any at−1 such that 1− āt−1 ∈ [R− ε,R+ ε], we have
Ht(E | at−1, s) ≥ Ht([ω̂, q̂−1∞ (R− ξ)] | at−1, s) +Ht([q̂−1∞ (R+ ξ), ω̂] | at−1, s)
≥ e−M+(C−C)(t̂−1)+(t−t̂)ρ
(




[α2, ω] | at−1, s
)
+








Ω \ E | at−1, s
)
,
where the second inequality uses the bounds on log likelihood ratios we obtained above, and in









Ω \ E | at−1, s
)
= 1 −Ht(E |
at−1, s), this yields




which completes the proof as the right-hand side converges to 1 as t→∞.
B.2 Long-Run Beliefs Converge to Steady States
In this section, we fix arbitrary true and perceived type distributions F, F̂ ∈ F and analyze long-
run beliefs and behavior. In each state ω, let qt(ω) and q̂t(ω) denote the corresponding true and
perceived fractions of action 0 in period t, and let q̄t(ω) := 1t
∑t
τ=1 qτ (ω) denote the true time
average of the fraction of action 0 up to period t. Let Pr(· | ω) denote the probability distribution
over observed private signals s and action sequences at when signals are distributed according to
Φ(· | ω) and actions in each period τ are distributed according to qτ (ω). Define the set of steady
states SS(F, F̂ ) := {ω̂∞ ∈ Ω : ω̂∞ = argminω̂∈Ω KL
(




Focusing on the case when SS(F, F̂ ) is finite, the key result of this section is Proposition B.1,
which shows that agents’ long-run beliefs always assign probability 1 to some steady state. As a
preliminary step, the following lemma shows that behavior in each state converges.
Lemma B.3. Suppose that SS(F, F̂ ) is finite. Then R(ω) := limt→∞ q̄t(ω) exists for every ω and
is weakly decreasing in ω.
Proof. Fix any ω ∈ Ω. Let R̄(ω) := lim supt→∞ q̄t(ω) and R(ω) := lim inft→∞ q̄t(ω). To show that
R(ω) := limt→∞ q̄t(ω) exists, suppose for a contradiction that R(ω) > R(ω). Since SS(F, F̂ ) is finite,
we can pick someR ∈ (R(ω), R(ω)) such that q̂−1∞ (R) /∈ SS(F, F̂ ). Let ω̂ := argminω̂′∈Ω KL(R, q̂∞(ω̂′)).
Note thatR 6= F (θ∗(ω̂)), as otherwise q̂−1∞ (R) is a steady state. Below we assume thatR < F (θ∗(ω̂)),
as the remaining case, R > F (θ∗(ω̂)), is analogous.
Pick R,R such that R(ω) < R < R < R < R̄(ω) and R < F (θ∗(ω̂)). Note that we can choose a
small enough interval E 3 ω̂ with non-empty interior, a large enough interval [s, s] of private signals,
and a small enough ν > 0, such that for any t, if at least fraction 1−ν of agents with private signals
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s ∈ [s, s] hold beliefs such that Ht(E | at−1, s) > 1− ν, then qt(ω) > R+ ν.52 By Lemma B.2, there





E | at−1, s
)
| s ∈ [s, s], 1− āt−1 ∈ [R− ε,R+ ε]
}
> 1− ν.
Moreover, we can take ε sufficiently small such that R < R− ε < R+ ε < R.
Note that each agent observes a sequence of random actions (a1, a2, ...) that are independent
from each other conditional on the realized state ω. Hence, by the weak law of large numbers for
independent (but not necessarily identically distributed) random variables (see, e.g., Theorem 1.2.6
in Stroock, 2010), there exists t̂2 such that for all t ≥ t̂2,
Pr
(















. Then at all times t ∈ T , at least fraction
1 − ν of agents with private signals s ∈ [s, s] hold beliefs such that Ht(E | at−1, s) > 1 − ν. Thus,
for all t ∈ T , we have qt(ω) > R̄+ ν.
Since R̄(ω) = lim supt q̄t(ω) > R+
ε
2 and R(ω) = lim inft q̄t(ω) < R−
ε
2 and |q̄t(ω)− q̄t−1(ω)| ≤
1











qtk(ω) > R − ε2 , since qtk(ω) >
R+ ν > R− ε by construction of T . This is a contradiction. Hence, R(ω) = limt→∞ q̄t(ω) exists.
Finally, recall that Lemma A.1 applies to agents’ perceived fraction q̂t(ω) of action 0 and implies
that q̂t(ω) is strictly decreasing in ω at each t. Given this, a similar inductive argument as in the
proof of Lemma A.1 yields that the true action 0 fraction qt(ω) is strictly decreasing in ω for each
t. This implies that R(ω) = limt→∞ q̄t(ω) is weakly decreasing in ω, as required.
We now prove that in all states, agents’ long-run beliefs assign probability 1 to some steady
state:
Proposition B.1. Suppose that SS(F, F̂ ) is finite. Then in all states ω, there exists some state
ω̂∞(ω) ∈ SS(F, F̂ ) such that almost all agents’ beliefs converge to a point-mass on ω̂∞(ω). Moreover,
ω̂∞(ω) is weakly increasing in ω.




Note that ω̂∞(ω) is weakly increasing in ω since R(ω) is weakly decreasing and q̂∞ is strictly de-
creasing. Consider any interval E 3 ω̂∞(ω) with non-empty interior and any s < s. By Lemma B.2,
52To see this, observe that if all agents’ beliefs assigned probability 1 to ω̂ at t, then qt(ω) = F (θ∗(ω̂)) > R.
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E | at−1, s
)
| s ∈ [s, s], 1− āt−1 ∈ [R(ω)− ε,R(ω) + ε]
}
= 1.





1− āt−1 ∈ [R(ω)− ε,R(ω) + ε] | ω
)
= 1.







E | at−1, s
)
> 1− ν | ω
)
≥ Φ([s, s] | ω).








E | at−1, s
)
> 1− ν | ω
)
= 1.
Thus, conditional on state ω, almost all agents’ beliefs converge to a point-mass on ω̂∞(ω). But then,
limt→∞ qt(ω) = F (θ
∗(ω̂∞(ω))), which implies that R(ω) = F (θ∗(ω̂∞(ω))). Since q̂∞(·) = F̂ (θ∗(·)),
this yields ω̂∞(ω) = argminω̂∈Ω KL(F (θ∗(ω̂∞(ω))), F̂ (θ∗(ω̂))); that is, ω̂∞(ω) ∈ SS(F, F̂ ).
B.3 Proof of Theorem 1
Fix any F ∈ F , ω̂ ∈ Ω, and ε > 0. We can pick F̂ ∈ F such that F̂ crosses F from below in the
single point θ∗(ω̂), as shown in Figure 2; clearly, we can also require that ‖F − F̂‖ < ε. In this
case, SS(F, F̂ ) = {ω̂}. Thus, Proposition B.1 implies that in all states ω, almost all agents’ beliefs
converge to a point-mass on ω̂.
B.4 Proof of Theorem 2
Fix any analytic F, F̂ ∈ F with F̂ 6= F . Then the set {θ ∈ [θ∗(ω), θ∗(ω)] : F (θ) = F̂ (θ)} is
finite (possibly empty).53 But this implies that SS(F, F̂ ) is finite, as every ω̂∞ ∈ SS(F, F̂ ) satisfies
either F (θ∗(ω̂∞)) = F̂ (θ∗(ω̂∞)) or ω̂∞ ∈ {ω, ω}. Thus, Proposition B.1 implies that in every state
ω, almost all agents’ beliefs converge to a point-mass on a state ω̂∞(ω) ∈ Ω, where the mapping
ω 7→ ω̂∞(ω) is weakly increasing and has finite range.
53To see this, suppose for a contradiction that F − F̂ = 0 admits an infinite sequence θ1, θ2, . . . of distinct solutions
in Θ∗ := [θ∗(ω), θ∗(ω)]. By sequential compactness of Θ∗, restricting to a subsequence if necessary, we can assume
that the sequence converges. Then since F − F̂ is analytic on R, the principle of permanence implies that F − F̂ is
identically zero on R, contradicting F̂ 6= F .
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C Proof of Theorem 3
C.1 Theorem 3: Proof of Part 1
Fix any Ωn and any true type distribution F ∈ F . For any perception F̂ ∈ F , let qt(ω; F̂ ) and
q̂t(ω; F̂ ) denote the true and perceived fractions of action in 0 in period t and state ω ∈ Ωn, and let








τ=1 q̂τ (ω; F̂ ) denote the true and perceived time
averages up to period t. Let Ht(ω|s, at−1; F̂ ) denote the probability that an agent with perception F̂
assigns to state ω ∈ Ωn following private signal s and observed action sequence at−1 = (a1, . . . at−1).
Take ν ∈ (0, 1) sufficiently small that F (θ∗(ω))± 2ν ∈ (0, 1) for each ω ∈ Ωn, and such that for
all pairs of distinct states ω, ω′ ∈ Ωn and all R ∈ [F (θ∗(ω))− 2ν, F (θ∗(ω)) + 2ν],
R log
F (θ∗(ω))− ν
F (θ∗(ω′)) + ν
+ (1−R) log 1− F (θ
∗(ω))− ν
1− F (θ∗(ω′)) + ν
> ν (5)




1− F (θ∗(ω))− ν
1− F (θ∗(ω)) + ν
, log
F (θ∗(ω))− ν






1− F (θ∗(ω))− ν
1− F (θ∗(ω)) + ν
, log
F (θ∗(ω))− ν
F (θ∗(ω)) + ν
}
< C.
Our proof uses the following three lemmas:
Lemma C.1. There exists ε1 ∈ (0, ν) such that for any ω ∈ Ωn, any t, and any perception F̂ with
‖F − F̂‖ ≤ ε1, if at least fraction 1− ε1 of agents’ posteriors in period t assign probability at least
1− ε1 to state ω, then qt+1(ω; F̂ ), q̂t+1(ω; F̂ ) ∈ [F (θ∗(ω))− ν, F (θ∗(ω)) + ν].
Proof. The result follows from a simple continuity argument based on the continuity of u and F .
Throughout the rest of the proof, we fix ε1 as given by Lemma C.1.
Lemma C.2. Fix any signals s < s, time t̂ > 0, and η ∈ (0, 1). There exists a time T1 =
T1(t̂, η, s, s) > t̂ such that for any ω ∈ Ωn, private signal s ∈ [s, s], and t ≥ T1, if perception F̂ and
observed action history at−1 = (a1, ..., at−1) satisfy
(i) ‖F−F̂‖ ≤ ε1 and qτ (ω′; F̂ ) ∈ [F (θ∗(ω′))−ν, F (θ∗(ω′))+ν] for each τ ∈ {t̂, ...., t} and ω′ ∈ Ωn,
(ii) at−1 ∈ [F (θ∗(ω))− 2ν, F (θ∗(ω)) + 2ν],
then the posterior probability Ht(ω|s, at−1; F̂ ) on state ω is at least η.
Proof. Pick T1 = T1(t̂, η, s, s) > t̂ sufficiently large that for all s ∈ [s, s] and distinct ω, ω′ ∈ Ωn, we
have (C − C)(t̂ − 1) + (T1 − t̂)ν + `1(ω, ω′) + log φ(s|ω)φ(s|ω′) ≥ log
η
1−η , where `1(ω, ω
′) denotes the log
likelihood ratio of ω vs. ω′ according to the prior. Now consider any ω ∈ Ωn, s ∈ [s, s], t ≥ T1, and
F̂ and at−1 satisfying assumptions (i)–(ii). For any ω′ 6= ω, we will show that the log likelihood
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ratio `t(ω, ω′|s, at−1; F̂ ) = log Ht(ω|s,a
t−1;F̂ )
Ht(ω′|s,at−1;F̂ )
satisfies `t(ω, ω′|s, at−1; F̂ ) ≥ log η1−η . The argument is
analogous to Lemma B.1. Indeed, we have
`t(ω, ω







(1− aτ ) log
q̂τ (ω; F̂ )
q̂τ (ω′; F̂ )
+ aτ log
1− q̂τ (ω; F̂ )
1− q̂τ (ω′; F̂ )
)




(1− aτ ) log
q̂τ (ω; F̂ )
q̂τ (ω′; F̂ )
+ aτ log
1− q̂τ (ω; F̂ )
1− q̂τ (ω′; F̂ )
)




(1− aτ ) log
F (θ∗(ω))− ν
F (θ∗(ω′)) + ν
+ aτ log
1− F (θ∗(ω))− ν
1− F (θ∗(ω′)) + ν
)




(1− aτ ) log
F (θ∗(ω))− ν
F (θ∗(ω′)) + ν
+ aτ log
1− F (θ∗(ω))− ν
1− F (θ∗(ω′)) + ν
)
− C(t̂− 1)
= (C − C)(t̂− 1) + (t− t̂)
(
(1− at) log F (θ
∗(ω))− ν
F (θ∗(ω′)) + ν
+ at log
1− F (θ∗(ω))− ν
1− F (θ∗(ω′)) + ν
)
≥ (C − C)(t̂− 1) + (t− t̂)ν.













≥ C. The second inequality follows from assumption (i).
The third inequality holds because for all τ , we have (1− aτ ) log F (θ
∗(ω))−ν











≤ C. The final inequality holds by (5) and assumption (ii).
Thus, by choice of T1, this implies `t(ω, ω′|s, at−1; F̂ ) ≥ log η1−η , as claimed.
Lemma C.3. For any η ∈ (0, 1), there exists T2(η) > 0 such that for any t ≥ T2(η), any true state
ω ∈ Ωn, and any perception F̂ , both the true fraction of agents who observe action histories with
at−1 ∈ [qt(ω; F̂ )− ν, qt(ω; F̂ ) + ν] and the perceived fraction of agents who observe action histories
with at−1 ∈ [q̂t(ω; F̂ )− ν, q̂t(ω; F̂ ) + ν] is at least η.
Proof. The result follows from Hoeffding’s inequality since true (resp. perceived) action observations
a1, a2, . . . are drawn independently across t according to qt(ω; F̂ ) (resp. q̂t(ω; F̂ )).
To complete the proof of the first part of Theorem 3, fix any true state ω ∈ Ωn. Take signals
s∗ < s∗ such that Φ(s∗|ω)−Φ(s∗|ω) ≥
√
1− ε1. Let T2(
√
1− ε1) be as given by Lemma C.3. Note
that when F̂ = F , the proof of Lemma 1 continues to ensure almost all agents’ beliefs converge to
δω. Thus, there exists t̂ ≥ T2(
√
1− ε1) such that for all t ≥ t̂, we have
qt(ω;F ), qt(ω;F ) ∈ [F (θ∗(ω))−
ν
2




Let T1(t̂, 1 − ε1, s∗, s∗) be as given by Lemma C.2. Then, by a continuity argument, there exists
ε2 ∈ (0, ε1] such that for all F̂ with ‖F − F̂‖ ≤ ε2 and all t ∈
{
t̂, . . . , T1(t̂, 1− ε1, s∗, s∗)
}
,
qt(ω; F̂ ), qt(ω; F̂ ), q̂t(ω; F̂ ), q̂t(ω; F̂ ) ∈ [F (θ∗(ω))− ν, F (θ∗(ω)) + ν]. (6)
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We show by induction that (6) remains valid for all t ≥ T1(t̂, 1−ε1, s∗, s∗). Fix any F̂ with ‖F−F̂‖ ≤
ε2, and suppose (6) holds up to some t ≥ T1(t̂, 1−ε1, s∗, s∗). Since t+1 ≥ T2(
√
1− ε1), Lemma C.3
implies that both the true and perceived fraction of agents with observed action frequency at ∈
[F (θ∗(ω)) − 2ν, F (θ∗(ω)) + 2ν] is at least
√
1− ε1. By the inductive hypothesis and Lemma C.2,
each such agent’s period t+ 1 belief assigns probability at least 1− ε1 to ω if his private signal was
some s ∈ [s∗, s∗]. By choice of s∗, s∗, the fraction of agents with s ∈ [s∗, s∗] is at least
√
1− ε1.
Thus, fraction at least 1− ε1 of agents assign probability at least 1− ε1 to ω in period t+ 1. Hence,
by Lemma C.1, we have qt+1(ω; F̂ ), q̂t+1(ω; F̂ ) ∈ [F (θ∗(ω))− ν, F (θ∗(ω)) + ν], which along with (6)
at t also ensures qt+1(ω; F̂ ), q̂t+1(ω; F̂ ) ∈ [F (θ∗(ω))− ν, F (θ∗(ω)) + ν], as claimed.
Finally, consider any perception F̂ with ‖F − F̂‖ ≤ ε2 and any η ∈ (0, 1). Pick signals s < s
such that Φ(s|ω) − Φ(s|ω) ≥ √η. Since (6) holds for all t ≥ t̂, Lemma C.3 implies that for all
t ≥ max{t̂, T2(
√
η)} at least fraction √η of agents observe action frequency at−1 ∈ [F (θ∗(ω)) −
2ν, F (θ∗(ω)) − 2ν]. Therefore, by (6) for t ≥ t̂ and Lemma C.2, any such agent’s posterior at all
t ≥ max{T1(t̂, η, s, s), t̂, T2(
√
η)} assigns probability at least η on ω if his private signal s was in
[s, s]. Thus, by choice of s, s, fraction at least η of agents assign probability at least η to ω at all
t ≥ max{T1(t̂, η, s, s), t̂, T2(
√
η)}. Since η was arbitrary, this completes the proof.
C.2 Theorem 3: Proof of Part 2
In each state space Ωn, define the set of steady states by








The proofs in Appendix B.1-B.2 do not rely on the fact that the state space is continuous and the
same arguments go through under finite state spaces. In particular, Proposition B.1 remains valid
for each Ωn and implies that in every state ω ∈ Ωn, there exists some state ω̂∞(ω) ∈ SSn(F, F̂ ) such
that almost all agents’ beliefs converge to a point-mass on ω̂∞(ω).
To prove the second part of Theorem 3, fix any F ∈ F , ω̂ ∈ Ω, and ε > 0. Take any perceived
type distribution F̂ ∈ F such that ‖F − F̂‖ < ε and F̂ − F is strictly increasing with F̂ (θ∗(ω̂)) −
F (θ∗(ω̂)) = 0. Then κ := minω∈Ω\[ω̂−ε,ω̂+ε] |F (θ∗(ω)) − F̂ (θ∗(ω))| satisfies κ > 0. Note that
F̂ (θ∗(ω)) is uniformly continuous in ω by the compactness of Ω. Thus, there exists γ > 0 such
that for any ω′, ω′′ ∈ Ω with |ω′ − ω′′| < γ, we have |F̂ (θ∗(ω′)) − F̂ (θ∗(ω′′))| < κ. Moreover, since
{ω1, ω2, . . .} is dense in Ω, we can pick N large enough such that any interval in Ω of length γ
contains at least one state from ΩN = {ω1, ..., ωN}.
Consider any state space Ωn with n ≥ N . We claim that SSn(F, F̂ ) ⊆ [ω̂ − ε, ω̂ + ε]. Indeed,
consider any ω̂∞ ∈ Ωn \ [ω̂ − ε, ω̂ + ε]. We focus on the case ω̂∞ < ω̂ − ε, as the case ω̂∞ > ω̂ + ε
is analogous. By construction, F (θ∗(ω∞)) − F̂ (θ∗(ω∞)) ≥ κ. Moreover, since n ≥ N , there exists
some state ω′ ∈ (ω̂∞, ω̂∞+γ]∩Ωn. By choice of γ, this yields F (θ∗(ω̂∞)) > F̂ (θ∗(ω′)) > F̂ (θ∗(ω̂∞)),
whence ω̂∞ 6∈ SSn(F, F̂ ). Thus, Proposition B.1 implies that in any state ω ∈ Ωn, almost all agents’
beliefs converge to a point-mass on some state ω̂∞(ω) ∈ SSn(F, F̂ ) ⊆ [ω̂ − ε, ω̂ + ε], as claimed.
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